GR L 7089; (August, 1954) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-7089; August 31, 1954
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
In 1941, plaintiff Domingo De la Cruz was employed as a special guard by defendant Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation operating a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. His duties included guarding the main entrance, maintaining peace and order, and reporting disorders. On July 4, 1941, Benjamin Martin attempted to crash the gate and, upon being refused entry without a ticket, attacked De la Cruz with a bolo. In self-defense, and after being cornered, De la Cruz shot and killed Martin. De la Cruz was subsequently charged with homicide in two separate criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8449 and Criminal Case No. 431). The first case was dismissed in January 1943, and after trial in the second, he was acquitted on January 31, 1948. De la Cruz hired and paid a lawyer for his defense in both cases. He demanded reimbursement from his former employer for these expenses and for moral damages due to worry and neglect of his interests, totaling P15,000. Upon refusal, he filed this action. The trial court, based on the complaint, answer, and an agreed statement of facts, dismissed the complaint, finding no cause of action.
ISSUE
Whether an employee, who in the line of duty and while performing his assigned task, incurs expenses (specifically attorney’s fees) due to a criminal charge filed by a third party (a stranger) arising from an act performed in self-defense during such duty, may recover said damages from his employer.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. The Court held:
1. The relationship between De la Cruz and the corporation was not that of principal and agent, but of employer and mere employee hired for a specific task (acting as a guard). The principle of representation was not involved.
2. There is no existing law or judicial authority directly applicable that obligates an employer to provide legal assistance or reimburse legal expenses to an employee charged criminally by a third party for an act done in the performance of duty, even if the employee is ultimately acquitted. While it might be in the employer’s interest to provide such assistance (e.g., to avoid potential subsidiary liability), it is not a legal obligation.
3. The damages (attorney’s fees) were not directly caused by the employee’s act of shooting in self-defense, but by the intervening, efficient cause of the criminal charges being filed by the State/ heirs of the deceased. The shooting was at most a remote cause, lacking the natural and continuous sequence required to fix civil responsibility on the employer.
4. The responsibility for the improper accusation (given the acquittal) theoretically lies with the heirs of the deceased and the State, not the employer who did not initiate the proceedings and whose only connection was employing the plaintiff to perform a duty lawfully and without negligence.
The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, with no costs.
