G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land located in Parañaque, Metro Manila, for a socialized housing project. The Municipality had previously made an offer for a negotiated sale, which was not accepted. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially gave due course to the complaint and authorized the Municipality to take possession upon deposit. V.M. Realty filed an Answer, treated as a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution, not an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code ( R.A. No. 7160 ), and that the action was barred by res judicata due to a prior expropriation case (Civil Case No. 17939) involving the same property, which was dismissed with prejudice in 1988. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s dismissal. The Municipality appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether a resolution, rather than an ordinance, enacted by the municipal council sufficiently authorizes the local chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings under R.A. No. 7160 .
2. Whether the principle of res judicata bars the subsequent expropriation proceeding.

RULING

1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation through a mere resolution. Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) expressly requires that the local chief executive act “pursuant to an ordinance.” An ordinance is a law with a general and permanent character, enacted after a third reading, while a resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking body on a specific matter and is temporary in nature. The Court distinguished the case from Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, which applied the previous Local Government Code (B.P. 337) that allowed expropriation through a resolution. The clear and unambiguous language of R.A. No. 7160 mandates an ordinance, and legislative intent must be derived from this express term. Therefore, the complaint, being based on a resolution, failed to state a cause of action.
2. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the principle of res judicata does not bar the subsequent expropriation proceeding. For res judicata to apply, there must be, among other elements, a final judgment on the merits. The prior case (Civil Case No. 17939) was dismissed due to the Municipality’s failure to deposit the required amount, which is a dismissal based on a procedural ground, not on the merits of the expropriation itself. Furthermore, the power of eminent domain is inherently governmental and continuous. The dismissal of one expropriation case does not forever bar the government from subsequently re-initiating the proceedings, provided all legal requirements are complied with. The Court also noted that V.M. Realty, as a successor-in-interest, was bound by the prior judgment, but since that judgment was not on the merits, res judicata did not apply.
The petition was denied, and the dismissal of the expropriation case was affirmed.