G.R. No. L-6469; April 29, 1955
ROSARIO MONTECLARO DE NAVARRA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Rosario Monteclaro de Navarra, was an elected municipal councilor of Miagao, Iloilo. She was charged with violating Section 2761 in connection with Section 2176 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 383 . The information alleged that on or about June 9, 1949, she willfully procured, worked, and took a direct interest in the approval and perfection of a contract of exchange involving municipal property. Specifically, the contract proposed to exchange a municipally-owned residential/commercial lot (where she and her husband, Ignacio N. Navarra, had built their house and were paying an annual rent of P30) for two parcels of land owned by her husband—one agricultural lot in Igtuba and another residential lot in Ubos.
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals established that: (1) The exchange was initially proposed by Ignacio Navarra in November 1948 and approved by the municipal council (with petitioner abstaining from voting) in April 1949. (2) The mayor protested the exchange, citing a dubious title on the Igtuba lot and a great disproportion in value unfavorable to the municipality. (3) To overcome the opposition, Ignacio Navarra, in May 1949, offered to include his Ubos lot as an additional consideration. The petitioner personally delivered this new proposal to the municipal secretary during a council session on June 9, 1949, and expressed her belief that it would settle the mayor’s opposition. The council then passed a new resolution (with petitioner again abstaining) authorizing the exchange of the municipal lot for both of her husband’s lots. (4) A public instrument of exchange was executed on the same day. (5) Thereafter, the petitioner actively followed up and lobbied for the approval of the exchange with various provincial officials and even with the Department of the Interior in Manila, using a special power of attorney executed by her husband on February 21, 1950, which authorized her to represent him and work for the approval of the contract.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, a municipal councilor, violated Sections 2176 and 2761 of the Revised Administrative Code by having a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a contract of exchange involving property of the municipality.

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is guilty of violating the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals.
The Court held that the petitioner undeniably had an interest in the exchange. By acquiring the municipal lot, she and her husband would save the annual rental they were paying. The prohibition in the law does not require that the contract result in an actual economic advantage; it is enough that the official has a pecuniary interest. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the violation could only be committed if the exchange was consummated (i.e., finally approved by the provincial governor as required under another section of the Administrative Code). The provisions (Sections 2176 and 2761) are intended to deter municipal officials from having any interest in municipal contracts or purchases of municipal property to prevent them from exerting influence or pressure on other officials. The prohibition covers steps taken to bring about the perfection and consummation of such a contract. The petitioner’s active involvement—from delivering her husband’s improved proposal and advocating for it during the council session to personally lobbying for its approval with higher authorities—clearly constituted working and taking a direct interest in the contract, falling within the ambit of the prohibited acts.
The penalty imposed by the trial court (six months imprisonment) was affirmed.