G.R. No. 121013 July 16, 1998
JOSE ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH DIVISION, HON. STELLA CABUCO-ANDRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 31, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, SPOUSES ARTEMIO L. MERCADO and JOSEFINA A. MERCADO, TERESITA, GREGORIO JR., IGNACIO and VIOLETA, all surnamed ESPELETA, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF or HIS DEPUTY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Almeda filed an action for quieting of title, annulment of sale and/or reconveyance with damages against respondents. He was the registered owner of Lot No. 312, portions of which he sold. Adjacent to his lot is Lot No. 308 registered in the name of the late Gregorio Espeleta, father of the respondent Espeletas. A portion of Lot No. 308, denominated as Lot No. 308-B, was sold by Gregorio Espeleta to respondent spouses Artemio and Josefina Mercado. Almeda alleged that the technical description of Lot No. 308 inadvertently included 6,407 square meters of his Lot No. 312, and that this disputed portion (Lot No. 308-A) was part of his property, citing his possession, lease of the land, and the existence of a right of way. He further claimed the Mercado spouses initially admitted Lot No. 308-A was not included in their purchase but later demanded his lessee to vacate, and that a forged deed of sale was used to cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the Mercados’ name.
During pre-trial proceedings, after several postponements, the pre-trial was finally set for February 24, 1994. On that date, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear. The trial court declared petitioner non-suited and dismissed his complaint, proceeding to hear the respondents’ counterclaims ex-parte. The court rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondents various damages (attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral and exemplary damages) as claimed in their answers.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, claiming he was not notified of the pre-trial as the signature on the registry return receipt was fake, and that his counsel failed to note the date. The trial court denied the motion, finding the order was duly received. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, but the trial court disapproved it for being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. His motion for reconsideration of this disapproval was denied. Petitioner then assailed these rulings before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, upholding that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. His motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition and in affirming the trial court’s disapproval of petitioner’s notice of appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory. Public policy demands that judgments become final at a definite date. The period to appeal is prescribed by statute (Sec. 39 of BP 129) and rules. While there are highly exceptional circumstances that may justify relaxation of the rule, the factual settings of this case do not present such extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner’s reason for the late filing—that his counsel overlooked the due date—was insufficient. Moreover, the records showed that petitioner and his counsel were duly notified in open court on November 12, 1993 of the February 24, 1994 pre-trial setting. Hence, there was no reason to complain about lack of notice. The right to appeal is statutory, and one must strictly comply with the rules. Since the judgment had become final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to perfect his appeal on time, the Supreme Court could no longer review the reasonableness of the monetary awards. The petition was denied.