G.R. No. 233155-63, June 23, 2020
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

The case involves petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa, a municipal mayor, who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The conviction stemmed from his issuance of extraction permits for sand, gravel, and other quarry resources. The Information alleged he acted with “evident bad faith” in giving unwarranted benefits to private parties by issuing these permits, contrary to Section 138 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), which vests the exclusive power to issue such permits upon the provincial governor.

ISSUE

Whether a municipal mayor, who issues extraction permits despite the clear and exclusive authority of the provincial governor under the Local Government Code, can be held criminally liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 through the mode of “gross inexcusable negligence,” even if the Information specifically alleged “evident bad faith.”

RULING

In her dissenting opinion, Justice Perlas-Bernabe argued that the petitioner should be held criminally liable. The ruling, as presented in the dissent, is as follows:
1. A violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 can be committed through three modes: manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any one mode is sufficient for conviction.
2. “Gross inexcusable negligence” is defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences, and does not require proof of fraudulent motive or ill will.
3. An information charging a violation of Section 3(e) is not limited to the specific mode alleged. Following Sistoza v. Desierto and Albert v. Sandiganbayan, the offense can be committed by dolo (willful act) or culpa (negligence). Although the Information against Villarosa alleged “evident bad faith,” the mode of “gross inexcusable negligence” is deemed included. A conviction for a negligent act can be had under an information charging a willful offense, as the greater includes the lesser.
4. The provisions of the law are clear: Section 138 of the Local Government Code unequivocally states that the permit to extract sand, gravel, and other quarry resources “shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor.” RA 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act) also states the “provincial governor shall grant the permit.”
5. A public official has a duty to know the fundamental limits of his authority. Ignorance of these clear and essential aspects of his office, absent a doubtful question of law or honest mistake of fact, constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. The petitioner’s failure to comprehend this basic limitation, despite the explicit legal provisions, amounted to such negligence, resulting in unwarranted benefits to the permit grantees.
6. The petitioner’s excuses—such as the municipal mayor’s general authority to issue licenses under Section 444 of the LGC or recommendations from the Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office—do not justify his failure to adhere to the specific and exclusive authority granted to the provincial governor. Special provisions prevail over general ones.
7. Therefore, the dissent concludes that the petitioner’s conviction by the Sandiganbayan should be upheld on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence.