G.R. No. L-6648; July 25, 1955
VICTORIAS PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., NORTH NEGROS PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., FERNANDO GONZAGA, JOSE GASTON and CESAR L. LOPEZ, on their own behalf and on behalf of other sugar cane planters in Manapla, Cadiz and Victorias Districts, petitioners-appellees, vs. VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Petitioners are sugar cane planters’ associations and individual planters from the Manapla, Cadiz, and Victorias districts in Negros Occidental. They executed standard milling contracts with the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. (for Manapla and Cadiz planters, starting 1918-1919) and the Victorias Milling Co., Inc. (for Victorias planters, starting 1921-1922). The contracts obligated the planters to deliver their sugar cane to the central for milling for a period of thirty (30) years from the first milling. After World War II, the North Negros central was not rebuilt, and all planters’ cane was milled at the Victorias Milling Co., Inc. central. The planters contended that the 30-year contract period expired in 1947-1948 for Manapla/Cadiz and 1948-1949 for Victorias, and sought new contracts. The milling company refused, arguing that the contract term was thirty milling years, not calendar years, and that due to six years of war and post-war reconstruction without milling, the contract period should be extended by six years (until 1952 for Manapla and 1957 for Victorias). The trial court ruled in favor of the planters, declaring the contracts expired after thirty years. The milling company appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the thirty-year period stipulated in the milling contracts refers to thirty calendar years from first milling or thirty milling years, and consequently, whether the period should be extended by the six years during which no milling occurred due to war and reconstruction.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts is thirty calendar years, not thirty milling years. The reference to “first milling” was merely for reckoning the start of the period. The six years of war and reconstruction, being a fortuitous event (force majeure), relieved both parties from fulfilling their obligations during that time. The milling company cannot demand fulfillment of the undelivered cane from those years, as the planters were prevented from performance by an impossible event. To grant an extension would be to compel performance of an obligation legally extinguished by impossibility. The contract term expired at the end of the thirtieth agricultural year from first milling, without extension.