G.R. No. L-6933; August 30, 1955
JOSE M. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose M. Ocampo leased two parcels of land in Quiapo, Manila, to respondent Vicente Uy on December 29, 1948. The contract required Uy to construct a permanent semi-concrete building, which would become Ocampo’s property after ten years, and to pay monthly rent, taxes on the building, and insurance premiums. Due to alleged breaches by Uy, Ocampo filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 22, 1953, seeking rescission of the lease, forfeiture of the building, and payment of sums. The parties submitted a compromise agreement dated April 23, 1953, which the court approved and incorporated into a judgment on April 24, 1953. The agreement required Uy to pay specified back rentals, monthly rent, taxes, insurance premiums, and architect’s fees, with a provision that upon non-compliance, Ocampo would be entitled to execution and the building would become his property without reimbursement. Ocampo later filed a motion for execution on June 13, 1953, alleging Uy’s multiple failures to comply with the agreement’s terms. Uy opposed, claiming a subsequent agreement allowed installment payments and that he had made payments, though not strictly per the compromise. Judge Conrado V. Sanchez issued an oral order on June 30, 1953, giving Uy until July 7 to comply, and a written order on July 7, directing Uy to pay back taxes and insurance premiums and authorizing release of deposited sums to Ocampo. Ocampo petitioned for certiorari with mandamus to review these orders.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders of June 30 and July 7, 1953, which modified the execution of the final judgment based on the compromise agreement.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that the respondent judge acted in accordance with the principle established in de la Costa vs. Cleofas (67 Phil. 686), which allows a court to modify or alter a final judgment’s execution when facts and circumstances arising after the judgment render its literal execution impossible or unjust, to harmonize the judgment with justice and the facts. The Court found that the orders were based on mutual explanations of the parties’ counsel and subsequent dealings between Ocampo and Uy that cured slight deviations from the compromise agreement. These circumstances justified the judge’s actions to prevent Uy from losing his building unfairly. The orders did not substantially prejudice Ocampo’s rights, and no grave abuse of discretion was found. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.