G.R. No. 222442 . June 23, 2020.
Nieves Selerio and Alicia Selerio, Petitioners, vs. Tregidio B. Bancasan, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Nieves Selerio executed a Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights on September 18, 1993, conveying a parcel of land to respondent Tregidio Bancasan for ₱200,000.00. The Deed acknowledged receipt of 50% of the price, with the balance payable when Nieves and her family vacated the property, which was stipulated to be not later than April 30, 1994. A separate civil case for partition filed by other parties resulted in a Compromise Agreement approved on September 2, 1997, wherein the plaintiffs waived their rights and agreed the sale to Bancasan shall proceed. On February 2, 2007, Bancasan demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Upon their refusal, he filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession on February 28, 2007. Petitioners, in their Amended Answer, raised the affirmative defense of prescription, arguing that Bancasan’s action, being one to enforce a written contract, prescribed in 10 years from April 30, 1994, and was thus barred when filed in 2007. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, agreeing that the action had prescribed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC, holding that ownership had been transferred to Bancasan via the Deed, and his cause of action for recovery of possession accrued only upon demand and refusal in 2007, making the filing timely.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s cause of action for recovery of possession has prescribed.

RULING

No, the action has not prescribed. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s reversal but on a different rationale. The Court clarified that the action filed by Bancasan was not one for specific performance based on a written contract, which prescribes in 10 years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Instead, it was an accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of possession, which prescribes in 10 years from the accrual of the cause of action. The Court held that Bancasan’s cause of action accrued only upon the issuance of an extrajudicial demand to vacate on February 2, 2007, and the petitioners’ subsequent refusal. Their possession prior to this demand was by mere tolerance, which does not give rise to a cause of action for recovery until that tolerance is withdrawn. Since the Complaint was filed on February 28, 2007, well within the 10-year prescriptive period from the accrual of the cause of action in February 2007, the action was not barred by prescription. The Court also noted that the RTC erred in ruling that no sale was perfected due to non-delivery and non-payment, emphasizing that a contract of sale is consensual and perfected by mere consent, and non-payment pertains to performance, not perfection.