G.R. No. L-7713 October 31, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN CADABIS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur appealed an order from the Court of First Instance quashing an information against Esteban Cadabis for violating the Election Law. The information alleged that on November 10, 1953, during voting and canvassing hours, Cadabis, a policeman, carried a carbine within the polling place and a 30-meter radius thereof, taking advantage of his public position. The trial court dismissed the information upon Cadabis’s motion, holding the facts charged did not constitute an offense. The court based this on the absence of an allegation that Cadabis was not authorized to supervise elections or that there was no tumult or disorder, referencing the exception in Section 53 of the Revised Election Code. Cadabis attached to his motion a document purportedly from the board of inspectors authorizing him to stay to keep order. The fiscal objected to its consideration, doubting its authenticity and arguing it should be presented at trial, but the court overruled the objection and acquitted Cadabis based on that document.

ISSUE

1. Whether the information failed to constitute an offense by not alleging the accused lacked authorization or that no tumult existed.
2. Whether the trial court erred in considering and relying on the documentary evidence (authorization from the board of inspectors) presented by the accused during the hearing on the motion to quash.

RULING

1. The information validly charges an offense. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred. Under Section 53 of the Revised Election Code, the general prohibition against carrying deadly weapons in polling places is subject to an exception for peace or public officers authorized to supervise elections who may carry firearms to preserve order in cases of affray, tumult, or disorder. In a prosecution for violating a statute containing an excepting clause, the information need not allege that the accused does not fall within the exception. The exception is a matter of defense that the accused must prove. The prosecution is not required to disprove it in the information.
2. The trial court improperly considered extrinsic evidence. The Supreme Court ruled it was irregular and improper for the trial court to consider the document attached to the motion to quash over the fiscal’s objection regarding its authenticity and timing. In hearing a motion to quash, only facts alleged in the information and those admitted by the fiscal should be considered, except where the Rules expressly permit investigation of facts (e.g., extinction of criminal liability, prescription, former jeopardy). The motion based on the document was not a proper motion to quash under the Rules, as it introduced a matter of defense not apparent from the information’s face.
The order dismissing the information was reversed, and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Costs were imposed on the appellee.