GR L 6923; (October, 1955) (Digest)

G.R. No. L-6923; October 31, 1955
CHUA LAMKO, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO DIOSO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

In March 1939, Chua Lamko obtained a judgment in Civil Case No. 7080 of Laguna to foreclose a mortgage debt of Eligio Dioso (predecessor of the plaintiffs) amounting to P1,910.10 with interest. The mortgaged property was sold at public auction to Chua Lamko as the highest bidder, but judicial confirmation of the sale was never obtained. Chua Lamko took possession and later sold the property in 1946 to Prudencio Maranan and Leovigilda Suarez for P2,500. These defendants subsequently sold it to Panfilo Velo and Gloria Reyes in 1948 for P4,200, who then conveyed it to Pedro Deza and Ligaya Sto. Domingo in 1949 for P3,500. On February 22, 1950, the plaintiffs (successors of Eligio Dioso) filed an action to recover the mortgaged property, alleging ownership and nullity of the foreclosure sale and subsequent conveyances. Chua Lamko, brought in as a third-party defendant, interposed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs based on the 1939 judgment, which he claimed amounted to P3,918.96, demanding payment if the plaintiffs refused to validate the foreclosure sale. The Court of First Instance of Laguna declared that Chua Lamko did not acquire title and could pass none, awarded ownership to the plaintiffs, reserved the defendants’ rights against Chua Lamko, and dismissed Chua Lamko’s counterclaim as having prescribed. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether Chua Lamko’s counterclaim based on the 1939 judgment had prescribed.

RULING

Yes, the counterclaim had prescribed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The judgment was rendered in March 1939, and Chua Lamko asserted it for the first time in this proceeding in March 1950, after more than ten years, thereby barring the action under the statute of limitations (Rule 39, section 6; section 43 of Act 190). The defense of prescription was not waived by the plaintiffs’ failure to plead it in their answer because, under Rule 9, sections 9 and 10 of the Rules of Court, prescription need only be specifically pleaded if it raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. Here, the dates (March 1939 and March 1950) were disclosed in Chua Lamko’s pleading and were not denied, so no issue of fact was involved. The Court also rejected Chua Lamko’s argument that the Moratorium Law suspended the running of the prescriptive period, noting that this issue was not raised in his brief before the Court of Appeals and was thus precluded from review. Moreover, the Court found the plea unmeritorious because Chua Lamko, having sold the property and received rentals, believed his judgment had been paid and would not have filed an action to enforce it regardless of the Moratorium. The judgment was affirmed, with costs against Chua Lamko.