G.R. No. L-8026; April 20, 1956
ISABEL PADILLA Y ANGELES, represented by her legal guardian, NATIVIDAD ANGELES VDA. DE PADILLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LUCIANO C. DIZON, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

In 1948, plaintiff Isabel Padilla, through her guardian, purchased a parcel of land from defendant Luciano Dizon for P18,000, believing it contained 233.90 sq. m. A resurvey revealed the actual area was only 182.9 sq. m. Plaintiff demanded either rescission of the sale with a refund of the purchase price or a refund of approximately P4,000 representing the proportionate reduction. Upon defendant’s refusal, plaintiff filed an action seeking these alternative remedies. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to either: (1) reimburse the full P18,000 upon rescission/cancellation of the deed of sale, or (2) reimburse only P4,000 with interest. The judgment gave the defendant the choice between these alternatives. Defendant initially appealed but withdrew it. When plaintiff moved for execution of the second alternative (refund of P4,000), defendant instead moved to comply with the first alternative (rescission and return of P18,000). The trial court granted defendant’s motion, ordering plaintiff to reconvey the property. Plaintiff’s subsequent petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Plaintiff then filed a manifestation waiving all her rights under the decision under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the old Civil Code (now Article 6 of the new Civil Code), seeking to restore the status quo before the filing of the case. The trial court denied this motion. Plaintiff’s appeal from this denial was certified to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the plaintiff-appellant may validly waive her rights under the final and executory judgment in her favor after the defendant-appellee has elected to comply with one of the alternative remedies granted by said judgment.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s orders, holding that the plaintiff could not validly waive her rights under the judgment after the defendant had made his election. The Court provided several reasons:
1. The legal provision on waiver (Article 4, paragraph 2 of the old Civil Code) prohibits waiver if it is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Here, the defendant acquired a recognized right when the court rendered its alternative judgment and he elected to comply with the first alternative (rescission and return of the purchase price). A waiver by the plaintiff would prejudice this acquired right of the defendant.
2. The complaint could be viewed as an offer by the plaintiff, through the court, to the defendant. The court’s decision embodied this offer. The defendant’s expression of willingness to comply with the first alternative constituted a formal acceptance of that offer. After acceptance, the plaintiff could not withdraw the offer; the defendant acquired a right to compel compliance.
3. Once the trial court’s decision declaring the deed rescinded on grounds of fraud became final and the defendant accepted that judicial declaration and offered to comply, the rescission was effected for all legal purposes. The plaintiff could not unilaterally undo this.
4. Citing American jurisprudence (49 C.J.S. 887), the Court emphasized that where a judgment is in the alternative, granting the defendant an option, the defendant’s election eliminates the alternative and is binding on both parties.
Therefore, the orders of the trial court, particularly that of June 5, 1951 granting the defendant’s motion to comply with the first alternative, were affirmed.