G.R. No. L-8020; April 11, 1956
ISABEL, DEOGRACIAS, GELACIO, PEDRO, and BASILIO, all surnamed ABESAMES, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ADRIANO GARCIA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

An action for forcible entry was filed by the plaintiffs-appellees (Abesames) against the defendant-appellant (Adriano Garcia) in the Justice of the Peace Court of Papaya, Nueva Ecija on January 20, 1951. The inferior court rendered judgment on April 4, 1951, ordering the defendant to vacate the land except a portion covered by his tax declaration. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance. The clerk of court notified the parties of the receipt of the case record on June 7, 1951. A year later, on June 11, 1952, the plaintiffs moved to declare the defendant in default for failure to file an answer. The court granted the motion on the same day, declared the defendant in default, and authorized the reception of the plaintiffs’ evidence, which was presented on June 18, 1952. The defendant received the order of default on June 17, 1952, and on June 27, 1952, filed a motion for relief from the order, alleging oversight due to a lost copy of the notice and a meritorious defense. The court denied this motion in an order dated July 1, 1952. On July 8, 1952, the defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order denying his motion for relief. This appeal was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the appeal filed by the defendant from the interlocutory order (the order dated July 1, 1952, denying his motion for relief from the order of default) is proper and allowable under the Rules of Court.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as premature. The Court held that the right to appeal is statutory and must be exercised in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 41 explicitly provides that interlocutory orders, such as an order denying a motion for relief from a default order, do not stay the proceedings and are not appealable until after a final judgment is rendered on the merits. The Court emphasized that this rule is a matter of public policy aimed at preventing multiple appeals and ensuring the speedy administration of justice. The State has a direct interest in the enforcement of this rule to avoid delays in litigation. Consequently, the failure of the adverse party (the plaintiffs) to object to the interlocutory appeal does not justify allowing it, as the rule is not a mere privilege for the parties but a mandatory component of the judicial system. Since there was no final judgment on the merits of the forcible entry case at the time of the appeal, the appeal from the interlocutory order was dismissed.