GR L 9598; (August, 1956) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-9598; August 15, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YU HAI alias “HAYA”, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On October 22, 1954, an information was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan accusing Yu Hai alias “Haya” of violating Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge alleged that on or about June 26, 1954, in Caloocan, he permitted and maintained the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard. The accused moved to quash the information, arguing it charged more than one offense and that criminal liability had already been extinguished. The Justice of the Peace Court, in an order dated December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash, holding that the offense charged was a light offense which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The provincial fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the order dismissing the information. The provincial fiscal then appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
The sole issue is the correct prescriptive period for the offense charged under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the offense charged is a light felony as defined in Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code and, therefore, prescribes in two months under Article 90. The Court rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that because the offense may be punished by a maximum fine of P200—which Article 26 classifies as a correctional penalty—the prescriptive period should be ten years. The Court held that Article 9, which defines light felonies as those punishable by arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both, governs the classification of the offense for prescription purposes, not Article 26, which merely classifies fines as penalties. The Court found the Solicitor General’s theory would lead to absurd results, such as creating two different prescriptive periods for the same light offense based on a one-peso difference in the fine and making the prescriptive period indeterminable until after trial. Since the offense was allegedly committed on June 26, 1954, and the information was filed on October 22, 1954, more than two months later, the crime had already prescribed. The decision appealed from was affirmed.