GR L 10129; (April, 1957) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-10129; April 22, 1957
PASCUAL ROMANO and JUANA LLEANZA DE ROMANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CRISOSTOMO PARIÑAS and CARIDAD DONATO DE PARIÑAS, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
The plaintiffs, Pascual Romano and Juana Lleanza de Romano, filed an action for damages against defendants Crisostomo Pariñas and Caridad Donato de Pariñas in the Court of First Instance of Abra. The basis of the action was that the defendants, as the legitimate parents of minor Antonio Pariñas, allowed him to drive a motor vehicle carrying passenger Editha Romano. Due to the minor’s alleged lack of foresight and experience, the vehicle overturned, resulting in Editha’s death. In their answer, the defendants denied permitting their son to drive, claiming he did so upon Editha’s persistent plea, and alleged the accident was due to her fault. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to drop Caridad Donato (the mother) from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of parties-defendants, arguing that under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code, the father is primarily responsible, and the mother only becomes answerable in case of the father’s death or incapacity. On February 14, 1955, the court granted the motion and ordered Caridad Donato dropped from the complaint pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, prompting this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the inclusion of both parents as defendants in the complaint is proper, or whether the lower court correctly dropped the mother on the ground of misjoinder of parties-defendants.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the mother was properly dropped from the complaint. The legal basis for the action is Articles 2176 and 2180 of the new Civil Code. Article 2180 specifically states that the father is primarily responsible for damages caused by minor children living in their company, and the mother is responsible only in case of the father’s death or incapacity. Since the father, Crisostomo Pariñas, was both living and capable, as alleged in the complaint, the responsibility is not simultaneous but alternate. Therefore, it was improper to join the mother as a party-defendant. The Court rejected the appellants’ contention that the complaint alleged acts of negligence by both parents, holding that such allegations do not establish a cause of action against the mother under the law, as her liability is contingent solely upon the father’s death or incapacity.