G.R. No. 107964 February 1, 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS, respondents.

FACTS

On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 were filed against Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig. After her arraignment where she pleaded not guilty, the prosecution moved to consolidate these three cases with 21 other related cases pending before RTC Branch 26 in Manila. The Pasig court granted the motion, subject to the Manila court’s concurrence. The three cases were re-raffled in Manila and assigned to Branch 52, presided by respondent Judge David G. Nitafan, where they were re-docketed.
Without any motion to quash having been filed by the accused, respondent judge issued two orders on July 20, 1992. The first required the prosecution to show cause why one case should not be dismissed for allegedly violating the right against an ex post facto law, as the Circular was published after the alleged violation date. The second order required a show cause why the two other cases should not be dismissed for allegedly violating the right against double jeopardy, positing that all cases constituted one continuous crime. The prosecution complied and also moved for the judge’s inhibition.
On August 6, 1992, respondent judge denied the motion for consolidation. The next day, August 7, 1992, he dismissed the first case on the ex post facto ground. On August 10, 1992, he dismissed the two remaining cases on double jeopardy grounds, also characterizing the prosecution as a “sustained political vendetta.” The prosecution’s motions for reconsideration were denied in an order dated September 7, 1992. The People, represented by the Panel of Prosecutors, then filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal of a criminal information without any motion from the accused, based on alleged violations of the right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that a judge cannot motu proprio dismiss a criminal case on grounds that are waivable, such as the right against an ex post facto law, without a motion from the accused. Under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to move to quash an information belongs solely to the accused and may be exercised at any time before entering a plea. By pleading not guilty at arraignment without filing a motion to quash, the accused is deemed to have waived all grounds for a motion to quash except those that are not waivable: (a) that no offense is charged, (b) lack of jurisdiction over the offense, (f) extinction of the offense or penalty, and (h) jeopardy. The ground of an ex post facto law is not among these exceptions and was therefore waived. The judge’s act of motu proprio raising and dismissing the case on this ground was a grave abuse of discretion.
Regarding double jeopardy, the Court found that the judge’s conclusion was baseless. For double jeopardy to attach, the following must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the accused had pleaded to the charge, and (4) the accused was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. In this case, the other cases pending in Branch 26-Manila involved different transactions and were still pending. There was no prior termination of any case involving the same offense. Therefore, no jeopardy had attached, and the judge’s dismissal on this ground was also a grave abuse of discretion. The orders of dismissal were annulled and set aside, and the criminal cases were ordered reinstated.