GR L 11617; (April, 1958) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-11617; April 30, 1958
JOSE M. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. MANUEL M. MUÑOZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City, Mrs. ROMAN PEÑA, alias TINAY and LEONIDES PEÑA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose M. Garcia filed an illegal detainer case (Civil Case No. 73) in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bayambang, Pangasinan, against respondents Mrs. Roman Peña and Leonides Peña to eject them from a parcel of land and collect unpaid rentals. The justice of the peace court believed Garcia’s testimony that the respondents were tenants paying a nominal rent and were in arrears, and rendered judgment in Garcia’s favor. The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). While the case was pending on appeal, and because the respondents did not file a supersedeas bond or pay the monthly rental as ordained in the judgment, Garcia moved for execution of the justice of the peace court’s judgment. The CFI issued an order authorizing the sheriff to place Garcia in possession. The next day, the respondents moved for reconsideration, alleging that the action was not really for illegal detainer but one involving ownership or the right to possession. They argued that the land was part of a former U.S. military reservation turned over to the Philippine Government and placed under the Bureau of Lands, and that they were in possession under a sales application. They also expressed willingness to deposit a sum for damages. The respondent judge, upon hearing the motion, set aside the order of execution, finding that the defendants had raised the question of ownership and had filed a supersedeas bond.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge had the right or power to set aside his previous order for the execution of the judgment of the justice of the peace court, after finding that the question raised in the action was one of ownership.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition. The respondent judge was fully justified in setting aside the order of execution. The Court found grounds to believe that the judge below must have found the real question presented was one of ownership, as the land was a portion of public land under the Bureau of Lands for which the respondents had applied. The action for unlawful detainer was evidently resorted to in order to deprive the respondents, who were possessors and sales applicants in good faith, of immediate possession. The lower court rightfully held the action involved the right of ownership or possession and not unlawful detainer. Therefore, under its general power to amend its orders to conform to law and justice (Rule 124, section 5[g]), the CFI was justified in setting aside the execution order.
