G.R. No. L-10214; April 28, 1958
DANIEL NG TENG LIN (DANIEL HUANG), petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS

Daniel Ng Teng Lin, alias Daniel Huang, filed a petition for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied his petition, finding that he failed to satisfy the “proper and irreproachable conduct” requirement under the Naturalization Law. The trial court based its denial on the following: (1) petitioner was charged with serious physical injuries in 1951, a case provisionally dismissed but not yet prescribed; (2) he was charged with speeding in 1950, a case dismissed with costs; (3) he admitted to having once paid a fine for speeding; and (4) he used two different names (Ng and Huang) without formal application, though permitted by the Bureau of Immigration. The petitioner possessed all other qualifications: he was born in Manila on May 6, 1927, to Chinese parents; resided in Manila throughout his life except for a one-month vacation in China; studied in local schools; was a merchant; spoke and wrote English and Tagalog; was of good moral character; was not opposed to organized government or polygamy; had no convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude; had no incurable diseases; and had a good faith intention to become a citizen. Being born in the Philippines, he was exempt from filing a declaration of intention.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner-appellant has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire residence in the Philippines, as required by Section 2, paragraph 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (the Revised Naturalization Law).

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and declared petitioner-appellant eligible for naturalization. The Court held that the dismissed criminal cases (serious physical injuries and speeding) should not adversely affect the petitioner’s application. Under the Constitution and rules of court, an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the provisional dismissal of the serious physical injuries case did not equate to guilt. Regarding the speeding case, the Court noted that no costs should be taxed against a defendant in a criminal case if not convicted. As to the petitioner’s admission of having paid a fine for speeding, which presupposes a conviction, the Court ruled that a minor transgression involving no moral turpitude or willful criminality does not, by itself, mar satisfactory behavior. Citing precedent (In re Pisingan Chiong and Tang Song Sin cases), the Court emphasized that a minor infraction, such as a violation of a municipal ordinance resulting in a small fine, does not constitute a legal impediment to naturalization or render one’s conduct irreproachable. The petitioner possessed all qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the law. The Supreme Court’s decision, however, would not become executory until after two years from its promulgation.