G.R. No. 130140 , October 25, 1999.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.; CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners, representing the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, sought to challenge the Ombudsman’s ruling that the criminal action against private respondents for alleged “behest” loans had prescribed. The loans in question were contracted in 1969, 1975, and 1978. The Ombudsman found the offense had prescribed because the loans were contained in public documents, making them easily discoverable. The petitioners contended otherwise, arguing the prescriptive period should run from the actual discovery of the crime. The case involves differing views on whether the prescriptive period for the contemplated criminal action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 should be reckoned from the commission of the acts or from the time the authorities actually ascertained the offense.

ISSUE

Whether the prescriptive period for the criminal action against private respondents for alleged “behest” loans should commence from the date of the commission of the violation or from the date of its actual discovery.

RULING

Justice Vitug, in a separate concurring opinion, expressed the view that the prescriptive period should begin to run from the day of actual discovery of the commission of the crime. He noted that while Article XI, Section 15 of the Constitution states that the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties is imprescriptible, this pertains to the civil action, not the criminal action. The criminal action prescribes under applicable statutes, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which provides a fifteen-year prescriptive period. Applying Act No. 3326 , as amended, prescription begins from the day of the commission of the violation, or if not known at the time, from its discovery.
Justice Vitug distinguished the case from People vs. Sandiganbayan, where the prescriptive period ran from the date of the violation because the misrepresentation in a land patent application was evident to the public officials processing it. In contrast, he found the instant case more akin to People vs. Duque and People vs. Monteiro, where the unlawful nature of the acts (illegal recruitment and failure to register with SSS, respectively) was not immediately evident or known to the complainants at the time of commission. The “behest” loans contracted in 1969, 1975, and 1978 were not illegal per se, and their unlawful character could only be determined after specific criteria were formulated by the Committee created for that purpose. Therefore, the start of the prescriptive period should be the day of actual discovery of the crime.