G.R. No. L-9124; July 28, 1958
BERNARDO HEBRON, petitioner, vs. EULALIO D. REYES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Bernardo Hebron (Liberal Party) and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes (Nacionalista Party) were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of Carmona, Cavite, in the 1951 elections for a four-year term beginning January 1, 1952. Petitioner served as mayor until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received a communication from the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, suspending him from office effective immediately. The suspension was to last until the final termination of administrative proceedings against him for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority, and serious misconduct in office, which the President had decided to investigate directly through the Provincial Fiscal as Special Investigator. The Vice-Mayor (respondent) was directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor. The Provincial Fiscal conducted hearings and submitted his report on July 15, 1954, but the matter remained pending in the Office of the President. As petitioner’s term was about to expire and no decision was forthcoming, he filed a quo warranto action on May 13, 1955, claiming respondent was illegally holding the office of mayor. Respondent and the Solicitor General, as intervenor, admitted the factual allegations but defended the legality of the suspension. The case was argued extensively, with amici curiae participating. Although petitioner’s term expired on December 31, 1955, the Court proceeded to decide due to the importance of the legal issue.

ISSUE

Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.

RULING

No. The President has no inherent power to remove or suspend elective municipal officials. Such removal and suspension are controlled by the particular law applicable. The President’s constitutional power of general supervision over all local governments does not include control or power to remove; it requires legislative implementation and is qualified by the phrase “as may be provided by law.” The specific procedure for suspension of elective municipal officials is outlined in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, which involves action by the provincial governor and provincial board, with appeal to the Secretary of the Interior (whose functions the President had assumed). This statutory procedure is exclusive. The President cannot bypass this procedure and directly suspend a municipal mayor for charges like oppression, abuse of authority, or misconduct. The suspension order issued by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, was therefore invalid. The Court emphasized the distinction between supervision and control, and the principle that municipal corporations, in their governmental functions, are agents of the State subject to its control only as provided by law.