G.R. No. L-12172; August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950. The ordinance required a written permit from the municipal mayor for constructing or repairing any building, imposed permit fees, and provided a penalty of fine and/or imprisonment for violations. A specific clause stated that if a building “destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner.”
Four years later, after Fajardo’s term, he and his son-in-law, appellant Pedro Babilonia, requested a permit from the incumbent mayor to construct a building on Fajardo’s land along the national highway, separated from the public plaza by a creek. The mayor denied the request, stating the building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. After a reiterated request was also denied, appellants proceeded with construction without a permit, citing urgent need for residence as their former house was destroyed by a typhoon.
Appellants were convicted for violating the ordinance by the justice of the peace court, and the Court of First Instance affirmed the conviction, sentencing them to a fine and ordering the demolition of the building because it “hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza.” The case was elevated to the Supreme Court as the appeal attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance.

ISSUE

1. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of Baao, Camarines Sur, is valid and constitutional.

RULING

The Supreme Court declared the ordinance null and void and acquitted the appellants.
1. The ordinance constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power. It confers upon the mayor absolute and unrestricted discretion to grant or deny building permits. It fails to state any policy, purpose, or standards to guide or limit the mayor’s action. Such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent a lawful activity is invalid, as it permits arbitrary discrimination.
2. The ordinance, as applied, is an unreasonable exercise of police power and amounts to a taking without just compensation. Even interpreting the ordinance to allow refusal only if a building “destroys the view of the public plaza,” its application in this case is oppressive. It permanently deprives the appellants of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes (preserving the view of the plaza from the highway). While the state may regulate property for general welfare, including prohibiting structures offensive to sight, it cannot under the guise of police power permanently deprive owners of all reasonable use of their land for aesthetic reasons alone. Such a permanent restriction that precludes any reasonable use constitutes a taking, which requires just compensation and due process.
3. The ordinance was not validly enacted under the authority of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 2243(c) of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes municipalities to require building permits only after first establishing fire limits in populous centers and prescribing the kinds of buildings allowed therein. There was no showing that the municipal council had established such fire limits or building standards before passing the ordinance.
The conviction was reversed, and the accused were acquitted.