G.R. No. L-13764; January 30, 1960
RAFAEL RUEDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELO JUAN, ET AL., defendants. VICTORIANO C. LULUQUISIN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On November 21, 1957, defendant-appellant Victoriano C. Luluquisin filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to annul a decision rendered on September 13, 1954. He claimed the decision was rendered without giving him his day in court. Plaintiff-appellee Rafael Rueda opposed the motion, invoking Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which requires a petition for relief to be filed within 60 days after learning of the judgment and not more than six months after its rendition, accompanied by affidavits of merit. Rueda argued the court had lost jurisdiction as the motion was filed beyond these periods. On December 13, 1957, the trial court sustained the opposition and denied the motion, a ruling reaffirmed upon denial of reconsideration.
The trial court’s 1954 decision was rendered after the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1954. Appellant’s counsel, Atty. Luis A. Cruz, did not appear. Notices had been sent to him by registered mail, but the return cards were not received by the court. The court presumed receipt in the ordinary course of mail and, noting that two previous notices had also been returned, concluded the counsel deliberately refused receipt. Plaintiff then closed his evidence, and the case was submitted for decision.
Appellant explained that his counsel, Atty. Luis A. Cruz, had died on April 4, 1954—about a month before the hearing date—which was why the mailed notices were returned unclaimed. Upon learning of his counsel’s death, appellant promptly moved to set aside the decision. The trial court rejected this explanation, ruling that notices sent by registered mail to the counsel’s last known address constituted constructive notice binding on both counsel and client. The court held the failure to receive notice due to the counsel’s death was not a jurisdictional defect and that appellant’s delay of over three years in filing the motion showed inexcusable negligence, making relief under Rule 38 time-barred.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s decision rendered against appellant is void for lack of due process, thereby allowing it to be set aside despite the lapse of the periods prescribed under Rule 38 for a petition for relief.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the trial court’s orders and the 1954 decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the rule on constructive notice by registered mail (Section 8, Rule 27) does not apply when the addressee (the counsel) is already deceased and there is no showing the notice was received by anyone on his behalf (citing Section 4, Rule 27). Here, the notices were returned unclaimed, indicating no person of sufficient discretion received them. Appellant, residing in Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija, could not have reasonably known of his Manila-based counsel’s death promptly. Consequently, appellant was given neither personal nor constructive notice of the hearing, depriving him of his day in court.
A judgment rendered without due process is void for lack of jurisdiction. The well-settled rule is that no one is personally bound by a judgment without being duly cited and afforded an opportunity to be heard. A void judgment may be set aside even after becoming final and executory. The trial court erred in applying the procedural time limits of Rule 38, as the fundamental issue was the judgment’s nullity due to a denial of due process, not mere relief from a valid judgment. Costs were imposed on appellee.