G.R. No. L-13496. April 27, 1960.
In the matter of the petition of DY SHUI SHENG to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines. DY SHUI SHENG, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

Dy Shui Sheng, born in Amoy, China on October 8, 1927, arrived in the Philippines on July 30, 1937. He filed a petition for naturalization on August 2, 1956, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was granted. The Republic of the Philippines appealed, contending that the two character witnesses, Luciano Atillo and Raymundo A. Crystal, did not meet the legal requirements. Atillo testified he knew petitioner since 1937 but lost track of him from 1941 to 1948. Crystal, a lawyer and former assistant administrative deputy treasurer, claimed knowledge of petitioner since 1936 or 1937 but admitted only seeing him in 1940 during alien registration and not from 1945 to 1948. Both witnesses provided general opinions on petitioner’s character without detailing specific facts to substantiate the required qualifications under the Revised Naturalization Law.

ISSUE

1. Whether the two character witnesses competently knew the petitioner for the continuous ten-year period required by law prior to the filing of the petition.
2. Whether the evidence adduced by the petitioner was sufficient to sustain the petition for naturalization.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and denied the petition for naturalization.
1. On the Competence of Character Witnesses: The Court found that neither witness could attest to petitioner’s continuous residence in the Philippines for the required ten-year period preceding the petition. Atillo’s knowledge was interrupted from 1941 to 1948, and Crystal’s was interrupted from 1945 to 1948. Thus, they could not personally vouch for the continuous residency mandate under Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Their affidavits, required by Section 7 to confirm such residency, were not substantiated by their testimonies.
2. On the Sufficiency of Evidence: The witnesses’ testimonies were inadequate. They merely offered general opinions (e.g., “I think the petitioner has a respectable conduct”) without providing specific facts to establish petitioner’s qualifications, such as good moral character, irreproachable reputation, and absence of disqualifications, as mandated by jurisprudence (Alfredo Ong vs. Republic). Furthermore, there was no evidence that the witnesses themselves were “credible persons” within the meaning of the law—i.e., individuals of good community standing, honesty, and reliability who could effectively underwrite the petitioner’s application.
The petition was denied for failure to comply with the stringent requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law.