G.R. No. L-12313 & L-12314; July 31, 1959
Pedro Jacinto, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Narciso Jacinto, et al., defendants-appellees. (L-12313)

Narciso Jacinto, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Pedro Jacinto, defendant-appellant. (L-12314)

FACTS

On January 27, 1930, brothers Pedro Jacinto and Narciso Jacinto, sons of Crispin Jacinto, executed a sworn declaration (Exhibit A). It stated that Pedro was the applicant for Homestead Application No. 102221 in Looc, Zamboanga. The declaration affirmed that Pedro, Narciso, and their father Crispin had all worked on and improved the land, with Crispin using his own money. It stipulated that upon Pedro obtaining the Homestead Patent and Torrens title, and after five years from the patent’s issuance, one-half of the land would go to Crispin, and the other half would be divided equally between Pedro and Narciso. It also included conditions about continued cultivation and a right of first refusal.
The homestead patent (No. 55556) was issued, and Original Certificate of Title No. 652 was registered in Pedro’s name on August 30, 1939. On April 24, 1950, Crispin and Narciso Jacinto filed an action for specific performance (Civil Case No. 209) against Pedro in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, seeking to enforce the 1930 agreement and claiming a share of the land’s fruits. Pedro, in his answer, claimed there was a separate oral agreement involving other parcels of land.
Before the specific performance case could be heard, Pedro filed a separate complaint for usurpation and illegal detention (Civil Case No. 297) in the Municipal Court against Crispin, Narciso, and others, alleging they forcibly entered the land and harvested its fruits. This complaint was dismissed, and Pedro appealed to the Court of First Instance. Pedro died during the pendency of the cases, and his heirs were substituted. The two cases were consolidated for trial.
The trial court ruled in favor of Crispin and Narciso Jacinto. It ordered the execution of a deed of partition in accordance with Exhibit A (one-half to Crispin, and the other half divided equally between Narciso and Pedro’s heirs) and dismissed the usurpation case. Pedro’s heirs appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the action for specific performance to enforce the written agreement (Exhibit A) had already prescribed.
2. Whether the agreement to convey portions of the homestead land after the issuance of the title is legal and enforceable under the Public Land Law.
3. Whether the factual findings of the trial court, regarding the parties’ agreement and possession, are supported by the evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto.
1. On Prescription: The action had not prescribed. The appellant argued that the 10-year prescriptive period for actions on a written contract began from the issuance of the title on August 30, 1939. The Court held this was erroneous. Under the terms of Exhibit A, the cause of action for partition accrued only “after five years, counted from the issuance of said Homestead Patent and certificate of title,” or on August 30, 1944. Counting from that date, the complaint filed on April 24, 1950, was within the 10-year prescriptive period.
2. On Legality of the Agreement: The agreement is legal and enforceable. The appellant contended that Section 21 of Act No. 2874 (Public Land Act) prohibited the transfer of homestead rights after final proof. The Court ruled this provision was inapplicable. The subject of the agreement was not the “homestead right” prior to patent, but the property itself after its acquisition and the issuance of title in Pedro’s name. An undertaking to divide and convey portions of the land to those who jointly occupied, cleared, and cultivated it does not violate the Public Land Law.
3. On Factual Findings: The trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence. The sworn declaration (Exhibit A) itself admitted that Pedro, Narciso, and Crispin all worked on the land. The appellant’s claim of a separate oral agreement concerning other lands was based solely on his own uncorroborated testimony, denied by Crispin and Narciso. Furthermore, a stipulation of facts established that both parties had lived on the land continuously since 1924, contradicting Pedro’s claim of exclusive possession and forcible usurpation by the appellees. The preponderance of evidence favored the appellees.
DISPOSITIVE:
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in toto. Costs against the appellant.