GR L 14191; (April, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-14191; April 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENRIQUE NARVAS, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The defendant, Enrique Narvas, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with “damage to property thru reckless imprudence” for a vehicular incident on July 27, 1957. The information alleged that while driving a passenger truck recklessly in Pasig, Rizal, he hit a carabao, swerved, and damaged two stores and a house, causing total damages of P2,449.00. Prior to this case, Narvas had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen days of imprisonment under a separate information for “multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence” arising from the same vehicular incident. That prior information described the same reckless operation, the same actions of hitting a carabao, grazing stores, and bumping a house, which resulted in physical injuries to several passengers. The trial court sustained Narvas’s plea of double jeopardy, barring the second prosecution for damage to property. The People appealed this order.
ISSUE
Whether the conviction for “multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence” bars a subsequent prosecution for “damage to property thru reckless imprudence” based on the same act, under the principle of double jeopardy, specifically whether the offense of damage to property is necessarily included in the offense of physical injuries as charged in the prior information.
RULING
Yes, the subsequent prosecution is barred by double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order. Applying Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the Court ruled that the offense of “damage to property thru reckless imprudence” is necessarily included in the offense of “multiple slight and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence” as described in the prior information. The essential elements of the prior information included: (a) the date and place of the accident; (b) the accused’s reckless management of the truck; and (c) the act of causing the truck to hit a carabao and damage stores and a house. These first three elements themselves constitute the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The Court noted that the prior information, by alleging the failure to take precaution to prevent damage to properties and describing the violent impacts, implicitly alleged damage to property. The value of the damage, while not specified, could be assessed at the minimum penalized by law. Since the prosecution, in proving the prior information for physical injuries, would necessarily have to prove the elements constituting the damage to property offense, the accused was in danger of conviction for the latter in the first trial. Therefore, the second prosecution places him in double jeopardy. The Court distinguished the cited case of People vs. Estipona, as it did not involve a prior information that itself described both offenses.
