GR L 12965; (April, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-12965; April 29, 1960
CARMELINO MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSEFINA DE CASTRO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Carmelino Mendoza filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the reconstitution of a supposed decision in a divorce case allegedly rendered on June 27, 1944, by Judge Gervasio Diaz. He attached a simple copy of the alleged decision (Exhibit A) to his petition, invoking Section 7 of Act No. 3110 , which allows reconstitution of a decision by an authentic copy or, if none exists, requires the court to make a new decision as if the case had never been decided. The trial court denied the petition. It found that Exhibit A was a mere simple copy without any authenticating marks—such as the stenographer’s or judge’s initials, a court seal, or any official sign—and did not conform to the regular practice of serving copies formally through the clerk of court after filing. The testimonies of both parties were deemed unreliable: Mendoza claimed the stenographer handed him the copy after the hearing, while Josefina de Castro testified she received a copy from Judge Diaz personally at the Manila City Hall in April 1944, even though the decision was dated June 27, 1944, and courts were then in Intramuros, not the City Hall. Additionally, de Castro admitted she remarried on April 14, 1944, over two months before the alleged divorce decree. No record or docket of the case could be found in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition for reconstitution of the alleged divorce decision under Section 7 of Act No. 3110 .
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial. It held that reconstitution under Section 7 of Act No. 3110 requires an “authentic copy” of the decision, which Exhibit A was not, as it lacked official authentication. The Court agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the parties failed to satisfactorily prove the existence of the divorce case or its decision. The inconsistencies in the testimonies—such as the incorrect location and timing of receiving the copy, the irregularity of a judge personally delivering it, and de Castro’s remarriage before the alleged decree—cast doubt on the claim that a case was ever filed and decided. Without proof of the case’s existence and in the absence of court records or docket entries, reconstitution could not proceed, even under the alternative provision for a new decision, as that presupposes a validly instituted case. The petition was properly denied.
