G.R. No. 47777 ; January 13, 1941
N.T. HASHIM, petitioner, vs. MARCELO T. BONCAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

On August 6, 1940, petitioner N.T. Hashim was caught red-handed in possession of counterfeit Commonwealth treasury certificates and was arrested without a warrant. He was released on bond the same day. The following day, August 7, 1940, a complaint was filed with the City Fiscal’s office. After an investigation conducted by the respondent City Fiscal under section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 537 ), an information was filed accusing Hashim of violating Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code for possessing 560 counterfeit 50-peso treasury certificates with intent to use them. Based on the sworn information stating that a preliminary investigation had been conducted and witnesses examined under oath, Judge Sixto de la Costa issued a warrant for Hashim’s arrest. Hashim was later admitted to bail.
Before arraignment, Hashim’s counsel filed several motions in the trial court. He moved for the respondent Fiscal to furnish the clerk of court with the testimony of witnesses from the preliminary investigation and the counterfeit certificates (citing Rules 11 and 13 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court). The Fiscal opposed, arguing Rule 108 did not apply to investigations conducted by the City Fiscal. Hashim’s counsel then moved, alternatively, for the court itself to conduct the preliminary investigation under section 4 of Rule 108. The Fiscal objected, stating the investigation had already been lawfully performed by his office. The respondent Judge (Marcelo T. Boncan) denied these motions. A subsequent motion to cancel the arrest warrant and insist on a court-conducted preliminary investigation was also denied, as was a motion for reconsideration. Hashim then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether, in a preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Manila, the accused is entitled to be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him. This encompasses the broader question of whether the existing legislation (specifically the Manila Charter provisions) authorizing the City Fiscal to conduct preliminary investigations has been repealed or supplanted by the new Rules of Court (particularly Rule 108).

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court held that the existing legislation granting the City Fiscal of Manila the power to conduct preliminary investigations has not been repealed by the new Rules of Court.
1. Applicable Law: The Court cited section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) and section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code (the Manila Charter), which grant the City Fiscal the authority to investigate charges and file informations. This power is reaffirmed, not taken away, by section 2 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which includes “city fiscal” among those with jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations for offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
2. Duty to Transmit Abstract: The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the City Fiscal was the “corresponding officer” obligated under section 13 of Rule 108 to transmit an abstract of witness testimony to the court. The Court reasoned this phrase likely referred to municipal mayors authorized under section 3 of Rule 108, not the City Fiscal. Historically, the purpose of such transmission from a justice of the peace was to enable the provincial fiscal to decide on prosecution. This rationale does not apply to the City Fiscal, who himself conducts the investigation and files the information directly.
3. Nature of Preliminary Investigation: The Court clarified that a preliminary investigation is an ex parte proceeding to determine probable cause, not a trial. Its purpose is to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and if the accused is probably guilty, not for the full display of evidence. The right of the accused to confront and cross-examine witnesses is reserved for the trial proper. Since a preliminary investigation was lawfully conducted by the Fiscal, resulting in an information and a judicial warrant, the petitioner’s request for the abstract was, in effect, a request for a second preliminary investigation, which was not warranted. The proper venue for examining the evidence is at the trial.
Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the abstract of testimony from the Fiscal’s investigation, and the respondent Judge did not err in denying the motions. The warrant of arrest issued based on the sworn information was valid.