GR 48695; (September, 1942) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48695, September 30, 1942
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. FELICIANO BASA, JR., and PILAR LOPEZ DE BASA, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS
In the estate proceedings of Amalia Arcega y Alfonso Vda. de Basa (Case No. 50872), the parties—Pilar Lopez de Basa (administratrix), Feliciano Basa, Jr. (sole heir), and Antonio Gonzalez (creditor and attorney)—jointly presented a project of partition for court approval. The document included an inventory of properties, a list of estate obligations, and an adjudication clause. Specifically, clause 3(d) acknowledged a debt of P20,250 owed by the deceased to Gonzalez, plus P5,000 for his attorney’s fees, totaling P25,250. It stated that Basa, Jr., and Lopez de Basa, jointly and severally, obligated themselves to pay this amount with 8% annual interest and, as security, mortgaged the real properties described in the inventory (Clause 2(A), Nos. 1-48) in favor of Gonzalez. Clause 4 adjudicated all properties to Basa, Jr., but expressly subject to the mortgage liens mentioned in clause 3, including the one in favor of Gonzalez. The court approved the project of partition “en todas sus partes” on January 12, 1938.
Subsequently, Feliciano Basa, Jr., through his attorney Benedicto M. Javier, obtained from the clerk of court a certified copy of the project of partition from which the entire page 22 (containing clause 3(d) detailing Gonzalez’s claim and the mortgage) was omitted, as expressly requested by Attorney Javier. This mutilated copy, along with the owner’s duplicate certificates of title, was presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila to secure transfer certificates of title in Basa, Jr.’s name free of the mortgage lien. Antonio Gonzalez objected and tendered a complete certified copy, requesting registration of the full document to annotate the mortgage. The Register of Deeds refused Gonzalez’s request, citing lack of authority to annotate a mortgage without the consent of both parties, as a mortgage is a voluntary transaction. Gonzalez then elevated the matter to the Court of First Instance of Manila via consulta under Section 200 of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE
Whether the Register of Deeds should accept for registration a certified mutilated copy or a certified complete copy of the court-approved project of partition.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, instructing the Register of Deeds to register the complete copy of the project of partition. The Register of Deeds has no authority to accept an irregular, mutilated document for registration. The mutilated copy was irregular on its face and should have been rejected. The Register of Deeds’ role is ministerial; he must ensure a document is regular and in due form but has no authority to inquire into the intrinsic validity of its provisions based on extrinsic evidence. The project of partition, signed by the parties and approved by the court, is presumed valid and must be registered in its entirety. A party cannot unilaterally alter or repudiate part of a court-approved document.
The Court rejected the Register of Deeds’ reasoning that a mortgage requires mutual consent for registration. The execution of the mortgage is the voluntary act; once duly signed, the mortgagee has a right to its registration. By executing the document, the mortgagor is deemed to have consented to its registration and cannot unilaterally revoke that consent. The validity and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one party (Article 1256, Civil Code).
The appellants’ allegations—that the debt lacked consideration, that they were deceived into signing, or that the mortgage clause was inserted without their knowledge—are questions of fact that must be litigated in a separate appropriate judicial action to annul the obligation, not in this consulta proceeding. They cannot, by presenting a mutilated copy, arrogate the right to annul the mortgage or amend the court’s order without judicial sanction. The decision on registration does not prejudice the appellants’ right to challenge the mortgage’s validity in a proper separate action.
