G.R. No. 48823 ; September 30, 1942
EDWARD HEIMAN, petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO CABRERA, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, and R. SUZUKI, respondents.

FACTS

On July 27, 1942, respondent R. Suzuki filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila against petitioner Edward Heiman for damages, alleging Heiman failed to return an overcoat and spring coat entrusted to him for repair, with a total claimed value of P284.80 plus 25% attorney’s fees (P71.20) and interest. The hearing was set for July 30, 1942. On July 29, 1942, Heiman filed his answer, contesting the values and alleging the coats were stolen in a robbery on March 29, 1942, by one Zosimo Abanto, who was facing a criminal case. Heiman also filed an urgent motion to postpone the trial because he was subpoenaed to testify in that criminal case on the same date and time. The respondent judge disregarded the motion, proceeded with the hearing on July 30, 1942, and immediately rendered judgment in favor of Suzuki for the full amount claimed. On the same day, Suzuki filed an “urgent petition” for immediate execution of the judgment under Rule 39, section 2, arguing his claim was unsecured. On August 1, 1942, the respondent judge granted the petition, ordering Heiman to post a P450 supersedeas bond within seven days or face execution. Heiman perfected an appeal and filed this certiorari proceeding to annul the execution order.

ISSUE

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion or without legal authority in ordering the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal based solely on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim was unsecured by any mortgage or pledge?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the respondent judge’s order. The Court held that even assuming, without deciding, that Section 2 of Rule 39 (governing discretionary execution before the expiration of the time to appeal) applied to inferior courts, the discretion granted is not absolute but depends on the existence of “good reasons” stated in a special order. The sole reason given by the judge—that “the claim of the plaintiff is not secured by any mortgage or pledge on the part of the defendant”—was not a good reason. The claim was for damages and attorney’s fees, which the defendant disputed, and there was no allegation or finding that the defendant was insolvent or was disposing of property to render the judgment ineffectual. To allow immediate execution on that sole ground would convert an exception into a general rule, contrary to the general principle that execution issues only after a judgment becomes final. Therefore, the respondent judge acted without legal authority and with grave abuse of discretion.