G.R. No. 48608 ; October 28, 1942
ELIODORA LIPANA, petitioner, vs. EULALIO GARCIA, Judge of First Instance of Cavite, and ELEUTERIO BELTRAN, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Eleuterio Beltran was the attorney for petitioner Eliodora Lipana, representing her as the private prosecutor in a criminal case for estafa against Joaquin Lipana. The Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissed the case upon the provincial fiscal’s motion for lack of sufficient evidence. After the attorney’s failed attempt to appeal the dismissal, he filed a “Petition to Fix Attorney’s Fees” within the same terminated criminal case. In this petition, he alleged that Lipana had not paid him for his services, as their contract stipulated payment upon the termination of the testate proceedings of Manuela Lipana, from which Lipana had received a share. He prayed the court to fix his fees at P300 and order Lipana to pay. Lipana opposed the motion on three grounds: (1) the claimed P300 was already included in Beltran’s claim filed in separate testamentary proceedings; (2) the court no longer had jurisdiction to reopen the finally decided and terminated criminal case; and (3) Beltran should file a separate, independent civil action if he believed he was entitled to remuneration. Despite the opposition, the respondent judge set the motion for trial and subsequently issued an order, citing Article 22, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, directing Lipana to pay Beltran P175 as attorney’s fees. Lipana now seeks the annulment of this order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge had the authority, under Section 22 of Rule 127 (a reproduction of Section 29 of Act No. 190 ), to entertain and grant a petition for attorney’s fees filed within a criminal case that had already been finally terminated by dismissal.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court annulled the order of the respondent judge. The Court held that Section 22 of Rule 127 did not authorize the procedure followed by the respondents. The respondent attorney could not claim a lawyer’s lien upon the judgment of dismissal in the criminal case. The criminal case, having been finally terminated, could not be reopened to superimpose a new and different action for the collection of attorney’s fees. The Court analogized this to being as plainly contrary to procedural law as grafting a fresh limb onto a dead tree is contrary to natural law. The proper remedy for the attorney was to file a separate, independent civil action. The case was deemed too plain for argument. The order was annulled, with costs.