G.R. No. L-13966; June 30, 1960 (Resolution: September 30, 1960)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO DACUDAO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On the evening of December 2, 1957, both the victim, Angel Sobrepeña, and the accused, Alberto Dacudao, a Constabulary soldier, were at a dance hall in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. Dacudao carried a Garand rifle. According to prosecution witnesses, after Sobrepeña finished dancing and was near the gate, Dacudao approached him from behind, called him “Procoy,” and when Sobrepeña turned around smiling, Dacudao shot him in the chest, causing his death. The post-mortem examination revealed an entrance gunshot wound on the left chest and an exit wound on the right chest, with no powder burns on the victim’s undershirt. The following day, Dacudao surrendered to the Chief Police of New Lucene, Iloilo, stating he killed Sobrepeña because the latter had previously mauled him, breaking his arm. Dacudao claimed the shooting was accidental, alleging that Sobrepeña suddenly grabbed his rifle, causing him to unintentionally release the safety lock and pull the trigger during a struggle. The trial court convicted Dacudao of murder.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly convicted Alberto Dacudao of murder, considering the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder but modified the penalty. The Court found the prosecution’s version credible and supported by the post-mortem findings, which showed no powder burns (indicating the shot was not fired at close range) and a left-to-right trajectory of the bullet (inconsistent with a face-to-face struggle). This disproved Dacudao’s claim of an accidental shooting during a struggle. The Court held that treachery (alevosia) attended the crime, as Dacudao shot Sobrepeña after calling his name and while the victim was turning around, unprepared to defend himself. This qualified the killing as murder. However, the Court found no sufficient evidence for the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was admitted. With one aggravating circumstance (treachery) and one mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender), the penalty was imposed in the minimum degree. The dispositive part of the decision was modified to impose an indeterminate sentence of not less than twelve years of prision mayor nor more than 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal.