GR L 38; (April, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38; April 6, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL TANCHOCO y MARCELO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The defendant-appellant, Samuel Tanchoco y Marcelo, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with theft, in conspiracy with an American negro soldier, of U.S. Army goods valued at approximately P5,346 on or about April 7, 1945. The co-accused soldier was not arrested. After trial, Tanchoco was found guilty as an accessory before the fact (accomplice) and sentenced to three months of arresto mayor. He appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution established that on April 6, 1945, Tanchoco contacted Deogracias Gutierrez to arrange for the deposit of goods in Gutierrez’s house in Caloocan for compensation. The following evening, Tanchoco arrived with a child in a U.S. Army truck driven by an American negro soldier, loaded with 24 bales of Army goods (fatigue suits, blankets, etc.). They began unloading the goods with the help of laborers called by Tanchoco. When an American soldier on a motorcycle arrived nearby, the negro soldier and Tanchoco (with the child) fled. The negro soldier later returned alone to complete the unloading. Gutierrez, suspecting the goods were stolen, reported to a guerrilla captain, who notified the police. The police seized the goods that night and turned them over to the Provost Marshal. Tanchoco was later apprehended.
Tanchoco claimed he was merely asked by the negro soldier to find a storage place for the goods, promising him compensation, and that he did not know the goods were stolen. He asserted he only suspected their illicit origin after the police seizure.
ISSUE
Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of Samuel Tanchoco y Marcelo for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the lower court. It found the prosecution’s theory that Tanchoco was an accessory before the fact untenable, as there was no evidence he induced the theft. However, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict him as an accessory after the fact to theft.
The Court held that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt of theft. While Tanchoco did not have direct access to the goods like the soldier, the circumstances—particularly the large quantity of goods, and the flight of both Tanchoco and the negro soldier upon the arrival of another American—led to the inescapable conclusion that the goods were stolen and that Tanchoco knew this. Flight is evidence of guilt and a guilty conscience.
The Court ruled that a person who receives property knowing it to have been stolen, for the purpose of selling it and sharing in the proceeds or for concealing it, is guilty as an accessory after the fact to theft. The evidence established Tanchoco’s guilt on this basis beyond reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The appealed judgment was modified. Appellant Samuel Tanchoco y Marcelo was found guilty as an accessory after the fact to theft and sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay the costs. He was given the benefit of one-half of any preventive imprisonment suffered. With this modification, the decision was affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Perfecto dissented, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the goods were stolen, a substantial element of the crime. He viewed Tanchoco’s flight as a natural reaction of an innocent person wanting to avoid involvement upon seeing the negro soldier abscond, and voted for acquittal.
