G.R. No. C.A. No. 9320; April 13, 1946
TIMOTEO ARROYO, claimant-appellant, vs. ANDREA AZUR, administratrix of the intestate estate of Eleuterio Dura, LEONCIA DURAY AND OTHERS, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS

Eleuterio Dura died on December 31, 1932. In the intestate proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, his widow, Andrea Azur, was appointed administratrix. Before the committee on appraisal and claims, Timoteo Arroyo filed a claim for services rendered as a domestic servant to the spouses for a period of twelve (12) years, from 1921 until Dura’s death. According to Arroyo, the services were hired verbally at a rate of P10 per month, with no fixed term for payment, and it was understood that payment could be made later, either in money or in kind (a piece of farmland). The services ranged from household chores to work in the spouses’ coconut, abaca, and palay fields. Arroyo received no payment during Eleuterio Dura’s lifetime. The committee allowed the claim in the amount of P1,200. The collateral heirs (oppositors) appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the court, the oppositors moved to dismiss the claim, arguing it was filed out of time. The widow-administratrix, as a party-defendant, admitted the verbal contract for services but fixed the monthly salary at P8. The court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. After the claimant presented his evidence, consisting mainly of his own testimony and that of the surviving widow Andrea Azur, the oppositors moved for dismissal on the ground that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the claimant’s cause of action. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claim, holding that there was no written contract between the parties and, therefore, no action could be enforced against the estate under the Statute of Frauds (Article 335, Act No. 190, and Article 21, Rule 123, Rules of Court). Timoteo Arroyo appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the claim solely because the alleged contract for services was not in writing under the Statute of Frauds.
2. Whether, upon reversal of the dismissal, the Supreme Court should render judgment on the merits or remand the case to allow the oppositors to present their evidence.
3. Whether the claimant’s action had prescribed for being filed beyond the period allowed by law.

RULING

1. On the Statute of Frauds: The trial court erred. The contract in question does not fall under the Statute of Frauds. Article 21, Rule 123 (reproducing Article 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure) requires a writing for an agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed within a year from its making. The contract between Arroyo and the spouses was for domestic and farm services at a monthly wage of P10, with no fixed term. Nothing in this verbal contract indicated it could not be performed within a year. The mere fact that the services were rendered and repeated over several years and that payment was deferred did not convert it into a contract within the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts, not to contracts that have been partially or fully executed. Here, the contract was partially executed, as the servant had already rendered the services; only the obligation to pay the price remained on the part of the employer or his successors-in-interest.
2. On Remanding the Case for Reception of Evidence: The Supreme Court will render judgment on the merits and not remand the case. When the oppositors moved for dismissal after the claimant rested his case, they opted to rely on the insufficiency of the claimant’s evidence. Although they reserved their right to present evidence, allowing them to do so after an unsuccessful motion to dismiss on appeal would invite unnecessary and prolonged litigation. The established doctrine, as laid down in Moody, Aronson & Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao and reaffirmed in subsequent cases, is that a defendant who moves for dismissal after the plaintiff presents evidence, and whose motion is granted but reversed on appeal, cannot be permitted to present evidence in his defense. The Court’s efforts should be concentrated on establishing rules that avoid protracted and costly litigation.
3. On Prescription of Action: The claim was not filed out of time. The oppositors argued that the appeal from the committee’s decision was notified on June 3, 1939, but the claim was reproduced as a complaint in the Court of First Instance only on September 6, 1939 (93 days later). This argument is untenable because the applicable law, as amended, authorizes the court to set a period within which the claimant must file his complaint. In this case, the complaint was filed within the period fixed by the court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The intestate estate of Eleuterio Dura is ordered to pay claimant-appellant Timoteo Arroyo the sum of P1,440 as compensation for his services for 12 years at P10 per month, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint, and the costs of suit. If the estate lacks funds, the administratrix is authorized to convey to the claimant a piece of land of equivalent value, executing the corresponding deed with court approval. Costs against the oppositors-appellees.