G.R. No. L-47068. April 8, 1941.
PEDRO JOYA y AGUSTIN JOYA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO TIONGCO, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners Pedro Joya and Agustin Joya appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 5, 1939. The core issue is whether a donation made in their favor by Marcelina Joya on October 25, 1928, involving a one-half proindiviso share of Lot No. 2347 covered by Certificate of Title No. 6116, is a donation mortis causa or inter vivos. The trial court declared it a donation inter vivos, but the Court of Appeals reversed this and declared it mortis causa. The deed of donation stated, in consideration of the petitioners’ kinship with Marcelina and their recognition of her right, title, or interest in the lot, that she ceded and transferred the share to them by way of donation, with the stipulation: “debiendo entenderse que esta donacion surtira efecto tan solo despues de mi fallecimiento” (it being understood that this donation shall take effect only after my death). The donation was legally accepted and registered on the back of the certificate of title. Subsequently, due to an execution of a judgment against Marcelina Joya, her one-half proindiviso share was sold at public auction to Jugo Arca on November 21, 1931. A final certificate of sale was issued to Arca on March 21, 1934. Arca later sold the property back to Marcelina Joya on July 6, 1934. Marcelina then leased the property to respondent Pedro Tiongco and later, on October 7, 1935, transferred her right of possession and usufruct over the share to Tiongco in consideration of a debt. On October 29, 1935, she executed a public document stating her total debt to Tiongco was P1,250 and agreeing that if she failed to pay within one year, Tiongco would become the owner of the property. Marcelina died on January 31, 1937, without paying the debt. These transactions with Tiongco (except those of October 7 and 29, 1935) were registered and annotated on the title. The title was later canceled, and a new one was issued on March 25, 1937, naming Florentino Joya as owner of one half and petitioners Pedro and Agustin Joya as co-owners of the other half of the lot.

ISSUE

Whether the donation executed by Marcelina Joya in favor of Pedro and Agustin Joya is a donation mortis causa or inter vivos.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the donation is inter vivos. The Court held that the stipulation that the donation shall take effect only after the donor’s death does not, by itself, characterize the act as a donation mortis causa. Citing precedents (Balaqui vs. Dongso, 53 Phil. 716, and Sambaan vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 47477 , March 13, 1941), the Court reiterated that for a donation to be mortis causa, the death of the donor must be the cause or consideration for the act of liberality. When death is stipulated not as the cause or consideration, but merely as a suspensive condition for the effectivity of the donation, the act is a donation inter vivos. The Court found that the cause or consideration for the donation was the petitioners’ kinship with Marcelina and their recognition of her right to the property, not her death. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed. The Supreme Court declared: (1) the donation is inter vivos; (2) as such, it partakes of the nature of contracts; (3) the property right over the one-half proindiviso share passed to the donees from the date of the deed’s execution and registration; and (4) since the donation was executed, annotated, and registered prior to Marcelina’s transactions with respondent Tiongco, Tiongco cannot validly assert any right over the property. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs.