G.R. No. 47966 ; June 28, 1941
LOPE ATIENZA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MAXIMINO CASTILLO, EULOGIA GIGA and JUANA CASTILLO, defendants and appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Lope Atienza, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Maximino Castillo, Eulogia Giga, and Juana Castillo to recover the sum of P1,836 as damages. He alleged that these damages resulted from the breach of an agreement between his parents and the parents of Juana Castillo (Maximino and Eulogia) that Juana would marry him. During the trial, Atienza attempted to present testimonial evidence to prove the existence of this marriage agreement and the services he rendered to the defendants in consideration of that agreement. The defendants objected to this testimonial evidence, invoking Article 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Statute of Frauds), which provides that an agreement made upon the consideration of marriage cannot be proved by testimonial evidence. The lower court sustained the objection. Since the plaintiff could not present any documentary evidence, the court, upon motion of the defendants, dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court correctly applied the Statute of Frauds to bar the plaintiff’s testimonial evidence intended to prove an alleged marriage agreement, which was the basis for his claim for damages.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the dismissal was proper.
1. The action was one for damages arising from an alleged breach of a promise of marriage. The Court found that the case fell within the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds (Article 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now Rule 123, Section 21 of the Rules of Court). An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry, must be in writing to be enforceable.
2. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants were barred from invoking the Statute of Frauds because they did not plead it. It held that the defendants could not have anticipated the need to plead it earlier, as nothing in the complaint indicated whether the marriage agreement was in writing or not. The presumption, given the nature of such agreements under the law, was that it would be in writing.
3. Furthermore, the Court noted that even assuming the alleged agreement existed, it was unenforceable under another provision of the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff alleged the agreement was made in May 1934, with the marriage to take place in 1938 when Juana turned eighteen. Since, by its terms, the agreement was not to be performed within one year from its making, it was required under the law to be proved by documentary evidence, not testimonial evidence.
The appealed judgment was confirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
* Justice Laurel (Concurring): Concurred in the result but on a specific ground. He agreed that the exception for “a mutual promise to marry” under the Statute of Frauds did not apply. The agreement, as per the complaint, was between the parents of the plaintiff and the defendant Juana Castillo, not between the prospective spouses themselves. Therefore, it was an agreement “upon the consideration of marriage” and not a “mutual promise to marry” between the parties, which must be proved in writing.
* Justice Moran (Dissenting): Argued that the majority erred. He pointed out that the Statute of Frauds (Article 335, No. 3) expressly allows an exception for “a mutual promise to marry,” meaning such a promise can be proved by oral evidence. He further argued that the provision requiring a writing for agreements not to be performed within a year (Article 335, No. 1) is a general rule, while the rule on marriage promises (No. 3) is a special provision. In case of conflict, the special provision should prevail. Therefore, a mutual promise to marry should be provable by parole evidence regardless of when the marriage was to take place.