GR L 1164; (March, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1164; March 13, 1947
ANDRES R. CAMASURA, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE PROVOST MARSHAL, MPC., DAVAO, ETC., respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Andres R. Camasura filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court after the Court of First Instance of Davao had denied his earlier petition for release from confinement in June 1946. That earlier denial was the subject of a pending appeal (docketed as G.R. No. L-874, Camasura vs. Provost Marshal). The issues raised in the instant petition were: (1) the validity and effect of a pardon granted to the petitioner by the Japanese Imperial Government on September 4, 1944; and (2) whether the petitioner could proceed with this new petition before the Supreme Court despite the pending appeal in the related case.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should rule on the merits of the petition in G.R. No. L-1164.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The Court held that there was no need to pass upon the questions raised because the case had become moot. This conclusion was based on the result reached in the related appealed case, G.R. No. L-874 (Camasura vs. Provost Marshal), wherein the Court had already ordered the immediate release of the petitioner—the identical remedy sought in the instant petition.
Separate Opinion (Feria, J., concurring and dissenting):
Justice Feria concurred in the dismissal but dissented from the majority’s reasoning. He argued that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not because it was moot. His view was that since a petition for habeas corpus on the same grounds had first been filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao (the subject of the appeal in G.R. No. L-874), that court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, the Supreme Court could not exercise original jurisdiction over a new petition on the same grounds while the appeal from the lower court’s decision was pending. To allow such a new petition would undermine the appellate process and the principle of res judicata applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.