G.R. No. L-670; April 30, 1947
Segunda Santiago and Valerio Flores, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Pablo Valenzuela and Moises Pardo, Provincial Sheriffs of Camarines Sur, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) from the Justice of the Peace of Minalabac in a case between the same parties for the same cause. The trial court, after considering the complaint (which alleged the prior judgment was fraudulently obtained) and the answer, dismissed the complaint, finding the allegation of fraud unfounded. The appellants received notice of the dismissal order on April 2, 1946. On May 3, 1946, they filed a motion for new trial, which the lower court denied on May 11 for non-compliance with procedural rules. Notice of this denial was sent by ordinary mail on May 14. The appellants filed their notice of appeal, record on appeal, and a pauper’s petition on May 18, which the court approved on May 28. The appellees did not object to the approval of the record on appeal in the trial court on the ground of untimeliness. They filed a motion to dismiss the appeal with the Supreme Court only after the appellants had filed their brief.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should grant the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the prescribed period.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal. The right to appeal is statutory, and appellate jurisdiction is acquired only upon perfection of the appeal within the time prescribed by law. While Rule 41, Section 13 mandates dismissal if appeal documents are filed late, and Rule 52, Section 1 allows appellate courts to dismiss an appeal for such failure, the Court emphasized a distinction. If an appellee objects to the timeliness of the appeal in the trial court, the appellate court’s review of a subsequent motion to dismiss effectively constitutes an appeal from the trial court’s order on that matter. However, if no such objection is made in the trial court, the appellate court retains discretion. Crucially, the Court held that if a motion to dismiss on the ground of untimeliness is filed for the first time in the appellate court only after the appellant has paid the docketing fee, incurred the cost of printing the record, and especially after filing the brief, the appellate court should deny the motion. The appellee may be considered estopped by silence or failure to object in time, as this conduct would have led the appellant to believe the appellee acquiesced to the appeal’s validity and to incur substantial expenses. The Court cited its precedent in Luengo & Martinez vs. Herrero and Slade Perkins vs. Perkins in support of this principle of estoppel. Consequently, the appellees’ motion was denied.