G.R. No. L-162; April 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO ALCONGA, appellant.

FACTS

On the night of May 27, 1943, in San Dionisio, Iloilo, several persons, including the deceased Silverio Barion and a witness Maria de Raposo, were playing prohibited games. The appellant, Dioscoro Alconga, partnered with Maria de Raposo, acting as a spotter for her against Barion, the banker. Upon discovering this, Barion became angry, an exchange of words ensued, and Barion left, telling Alconga, “tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast,” implying an intent to inflict harm. On the morning of May 29, 1943, while Alconga was on duty as a “home guard” in a guardhouse, Barion arrived, said “Coroy, this is your breakfast,” and immediately swung his “pingahan” at Alconga. Alconga avoided the blow by falling under a bench. Barion attempted a second blow, which hit the bench. As Alconga crawled out of the guardhouse and Barion was about to deliver a third blow, Alconga, while still crawling, fired his revolver, hitting Barion. Barion then drew a dagger, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued, during which Alconga inflicted several bolo wounds on Barion. Barion fled, and Alconga pursued him for about 200 meters, overtook him, and another fight occurred, where Alconga delivered the fatal bolo blow that slashed Barion’s cranium, among other wounds. Adolfo Bracamonte, the home guard leader, then took Alconga into custody. Alconga was later turned over to guerrilla and police authorities. The deceased sustained multiple injuries, including a gunshot wound to the right breast and a fatal bolo wound to the head.

ISSUE

Whether the appellant, Dioscoro Alconga, acted in complete self-defense, thereby exempting him from criminal liability for the killing of Silverio Barion.

RULING

No. The appellant is guilty of homicide. The Court held that the incident consisted of two distinct stages. In the first stage, commencing when Barion assaulted Alconga without sufficient provocation, Alconga acted in lawful self-defense. The deceased was the unlawful aggressor, and Alconga, while in a vulnerable crawling position and unable to effectively use his bolo, used his revolver to repel the attack. However, when Barion fled after the initial fight, the unlawful aggression ceased. By pursuing Barion, overtaking him, and inflicting additional wounds, including the fatal blow, during the second stage, Alconga exceeded the bounds of self-defense. There was no longer any aggression to defend against once Barion retreated. Consequently, the essential element of self-defense—that the means employed were reasonably necessary to repel the attack—was lacking for the second stage. The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender but erred in appreciating provocation on the part of the deceased for the entire incident, as the provocation was inseparable from the initial aggression which had already ended. The appellant’s guilt for the crime of homicide was established beyond reasonable doubt.