GR L 1401; (June, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1401; June 25, 1947
RODOLFO YLARDE, FLOR DE VIDA YLARDE, represented by Maria Cruz as guardian ad litem, and JULIA YLARDE, petitioners, vs. JUAN ENRIQUEZ, Judge of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, BIENVENIDO SABADO, MAGDALENA SABADO and APOLINARIO SABADO, respondents.
FACTS
The respondents (the Sabados) filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Eugenia Ylarde, alleging they were collateral relatives of her deceased common-law husband, Simplicio Rosario. The action sought recovery of a fifteen-hectare homestead land originally granted to Rosario and damages of P50,000, contesting an extrajudicial partition executed by Eugenia Ylarde after Rosario’s death wherein she claimed to be the sole heir. During the pendency of the case, Eugenia Ylarde died and was substituted as defendant by the petitioners (the Ylardes). The trial court appointed a receiver to take possession of the land, preserve and administer its crops, and perform necessary acts during the litigation. The petitioners filed this certiorari proceeding to vacate the appointment, alleging the court abused its discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in appointing a receiver over the disputed agricultural land and its crops.
RULING
Yes, the trial court abused its discretion. The appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy to be exercised with great caution, especially when it involves taking real estate out of a defendant’s possession before final adjudication. Such appointment should only be made in extreme cases upon a clear showing of necessity to prevent grave and irremediable loss. The land itself was not in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured. The plaintiffs’ interest in the standing or harvested crops was contingent upon their success in proving title to the land, which was still undecided. The crops were planted and raised exclusively by the defendants or their representatives at considerable cost and effort. Appointing a receiver would likely cause greater injury to the defendants by disrupting their possession and management than any potential injury to the plaintiffs from leaving possession undisturbed. The plaintiffs’ adequate remedy, if any, was to seek a bond for damages. The order of appointment is revoked.