G.R. No. L-1302. July 31, 1947.
MIGUEL J. YSRAEL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and LA PERLA DE LA INDIA, respondents.

FACTS

On May 8, 1946, petitioner Miguel J. Ysrael filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent La Perla de la India, a registered partnership leasing his property, in the Municipal Court of Manila. The court ordered the defendant to vacate and pay P2,000 monthly for occupation. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Pending appeal, on July 27, 1946, the defendant moved to substitute a surety bond for the required monthly cash deposits of rentals to stay execution under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. The CFI denied this motion, and the defendant made the monthly deposits. On October 9, 1946, the CFI rendered judgment ousting the defendant and ordering it to pay P1,400 monthly until vacating the premises. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. Before the record was transmitted, on December 10, 1946, the defendant again asked the CFI for permission to file a surety bond in lieu of monthly cash deposits. The petition was denied, but the bond was filed nonetheless, followed by a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The record was elevated to the Court of Appeals on January 3, 1947. The petitioner immediately moved for execution of the judgment due to the defendant’s failure to pay the rental for November 1946. The defendant opposed, alleging it had filed a bond and complied with the law. On January 25, 1947, the Court of Appeals, while holding the defendant in default, granted it ten days from notice to deposit the rents for November and December 1946 and January 1947, and to continue making deposits by the tenth of each succeeding month, failing which execution would issue. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion in granting the defendant-lessee an extension of time to deposit the monthly rentals after it had willfully failed to make the periodic payments required by the Rules of Court to stay execution of an ejectment judgment pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the resolution of the Court of Appeals, and ordered that execution may issue for the petitioner, without prejudice to the respondent’s appeal.
The Court held that the provisions of Sections 8 and 9, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court are mandatory. During the pendency of an appeal in the CFI, the defendant in a detainer case must pay to the plaintiff or deposit in court the monthly rentals on or before the tenth day of each calendar month. Execution shall issue immediately upon failure to make such payments. These deposits are required in addition to any bond filed to guarantee payment of rents, damages, and costs down to the time of final judgment. When the defendant appeals from the CFI, Section 9 provides that execution shall not be stayed unless the corresponding monthly payments or deposits are made. The Rules do not authorize the acceptance of a bond in lieu of these cash payments. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct in its view that a bond would not suffice.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in extending the time for payment or deposit, as it had no power to do so. Citing precedent (Lapuz vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, 46 Phil. 77; Guillena vs. Borja and Sumampan, 53 Phil. 379; Zamora vs. Dinglasan and Hilario, 77 Phil. 49), the Supreme Court reiterated that the rule on execution upon failure to pay or deposit rents is mandatory. The court has no discretion to extend the time for payment or to evade the immediate execution of the judgment for such failure. The failure of the respondent to pay the rent for November 1946 on time warranted immediate execution. The dissenting opinion, which argued for a more flexible application of the rule based on substantial justice and the defendant’s belief (citing Mitschiener vs. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55) that its bond prevented default, did not prevail. The majority emphasized the mandatory nature of the rule, especially where, as here, the failure to pay was deliberate and willful, and there was no showing that the premises involved a dwelling to which Republic Act No. 66 (providing certain protections) might apply.