GR L 861; (September, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-861; September 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL ZAPANTA Y TUAZON, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
At about midnight on September 15, 1945, the accused Angel Zapanta y Tuazon and Antero Gomez went to the house of Policarpio Salazar on Francisco Street, Tondo, Manila. Gomez removed a bamboo bar from the gate, and both climbed the stairs and knocked on the door. When asked who was there, one of them falsely identified himself as “Maning” and requested entry, pretending to have something to tell Salazar. Upon the door being opened by Salazar’s wife, Ponciana Isidro, the two entered with drawn pistols. Zapanta pointed his gun at Salazar and asked, “Are you Totoy Kalabaw?” (Salazar’s nickname). Salazar and Zapanta then grappled for possession of the firearm, and at that moment, Gomez shot and killed Salazar. Both assailants fled immediately. Zapanta’s gun was left behind at the scene and was later recovered by police investigators. Investigation revealed that two days prior to the incident, Gomez, after informing Zapanta of a quarrel with Salazar, asked for his help to kill Salazar, to which Zapanta agreed. Antero Gomez was not prosecuted as he died before the information was filed. The defendant-appellant, Angel Zapanta, attempted to prove an alibi through his lone testimony, which the trial judge discredited based on its lack of corroboration, Zapanta’s criminal record, and the positive identification by the eyewitness widow, Ponciana Isidro, supported by the finding of his gun and his confessions (Exhibits C and Q).
ISSUE
1. Whether the accused Angel Zapanta was sufficiently identified as one of the perpetrators.
2. Whether there was a conspiracy between Zapanta and Antero Gomez such that Zapanta is criminally liable for the murder committed by Gomez.
3. Whether the trial court erred in considering the accused’s confessions (Exhibits C and Q).
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, finding the accused guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
1. On Identification: The Court held that the accused was sufficiently identified. The conditions for identification were favorable: the scene was illuminated by a kerosene lamp, and the eyewitness, the victim’s widow Ponciana Isidro, had no apparent bias against the accused and had a strong motive to remember the assailants’ faces. Her positive identification was corroborated by the recovery of Zapanta’s gun at the scene and by his own confessions.
2. On Conspiracy: The Court ruled that conspiracy was established. The evidence showed that Zapanta agreed to help Gomez kill Salazar two days before the incident. They then went together to the victim’s house at midnight, tricked the occupants into opening the door, and entered with drawn pistols, resulting in Salazar’s immediate killing. This concerted action demonstrated a common homicidal intent, giving rise to solidary criminal responsibility for the murder.
3. On the Confessions: The Court found no error in the trial court’s consideration of the confessions (Exhibits C and Q). The defense did not claim the confessions were obtained through violence or fraud but argued they contained improbabilities. The Court held that mere improbability does not invalidate a confession voluntarily made. Since there was evidence the confessions were voluntarily signed, the accused could not impugn the facts described therein on grounds of improbability.
The offense was murder, qualified by evident premeditation. Although the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present, the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, in accordance with the law.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Perfecto):
Justice Perfecto dissented, voting for acquittal. He argued that the guilt of the appellant was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He found the eyewitness identification unreliable, as the widow initially could not identify the assailants and only later named Zapanta. More significantly, he gave credence to the appellant’s uncontradicted testimony that his confessions (Exhibits Q and C) were extracted through torture and maltreatment by the police. Since the prosecution did not rebut this claim, and given the known prevalence of such third-degree methods, Justice Perfecto concluded the confessions were involuntary and inadmissible. Without the confessions and with doubtful identification, he believed the evidence was insufficient for conviction.
