G.R. No. L-1122; September 17, 1947
MODESTO SANTOS, petitioner, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of the First Instance of Bulacan, PABLO RAMOS, and AURELIA SANCHEZ, respondents.

FACTS

Modesto Santos filed a lawsuit against the surviving children of his deceased brother, Simplicio Santos (the vendors), and Pablo Ramos and Aurelia Sanchez (the vendees or purchasers). Santos claimed he held the fishpond in question under a verbal contract of indefinite lease with his deceased brother, which included an option to purchase the property if the owner decided to sell it. After the vendors sold the fishpond to Ramos and Sanchez, Santos sued to have the sale declared null and void, to be allowed to exercise his option to purchase the fishpond for P120,000, or to compel the defendants to respect his lease contract and pay damages. The respondents Ramos and Sanchez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to them, on the ground that it did not allege a cause of action against them. The respondent Judge Potenciano Pecson sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint with respect to Ramos and Sanchez. Modesto Santos then filed this petition for certiorari to review that order.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether a petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to challenge the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint against two of the defendants (the purchasers, Ramos and Sanchez).

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for certiorari.
1. Certiorari is not the proper remedy. The Court held that certiorari is not the appropriate remedy to set aside an order of dismissal. Such an order is within the jurisdiction of the court to make, and the proper remedy is by appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The Court clarified that whether the order is interlocutory or final is immaterial to the availability of certiorari; the difference only affects when an appeal can be taken. Mere possible delay in the appeal process is not a justification for departing from the prescribed appellate procedure, unless there is a lack or excess of jurisdiction, an abuse of discretion, and the delay would cause injustice or make an appeal ineffectual (e.g., if execution had been issued, a receiver appointed, or attachment levied). No such irreparable damage was foreseen in this case, as an appeal would provide an adequate and complete remedy.
2. Nature of the Order (for guidance). For the convenience of the parties, the Court addressed whether the dismissal order was final or interlocutory to indicate if an immediate appeal was permissible. The Court ruled that with respect to the dismissed defendants (Ramos and Sanchez), the order was final, as it would forever remove them from the case unless modified or reversed. The Court noted that while some jurisdictions require a judgment to be final as to all parties to be appealable, Philippine jurisprudence (citing Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide) leans toward allowing an appeal even if the order is final only as to some parties. Given the circumstances, the Court held the order was appealable without waiting for a final judgment against the other defendants, because the purchasers had a vital interest in the annulment of the sale and other reliefs sought, making a single trial necessary unless their exclusion was definitively adjudged.
Separate Opinions:
* Justice Feria (dissenting, with Chief Justice Moran concurring): The dissent argued that the order dismissing the complaint against the purchasers was not final and therefore not appealable, because the vendors and vendees had a common interest adverse to the plaintiff. A judgment against one would necessarily affect the others, making them indispensable parties requiring a single trial and judgment. Since the order was interlocutory and not appealable, certiorari would lie if there was grave abuse of discretion. The dissent found that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to dismiss as to the vendees, as (a) their interests were not severable from the vendors, making a several judgment improper under Rule 35, Section 4, and (b) the grounds for dismissal were not indubitable, so the hearing on the motion should have been deferred until trial under Rule 8, Section 3. The dissent would have granted the petition, set aside the order, and directed the judge to defer the motion’s resolution until trial.