G.R. No. 28117 , September 27, 1927
LORENZA SUNGA, as administratrix of the estate of Cipriano Caliñgad, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO TINGIN and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, respondents.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 2072, Catalina Manalansan et al. obtained a judgment for P500 against Cipriano Caliñgad. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on several parcels of land believed to be Caliñgad’s property and sold them at public auction to the judgment creditors (Manalansan et al.). Caliñgad later redeemed the properties within the legal period. However, one of the parcels levied upon (less than 3 hectares) was actually part of a larger tract already covered by a Torrens title in the name of Manalansan et al. The sheriff had mistakenly levied on property belonging to the judgment creditors themselves. Meanwhile, Manalansan et al. sold the entire tract, including the disputed parcel, to Francisco Tingin, who acquired both ownership and possession. After Caliñgad’s death, his widow, Lorenza Sunga, as administratrix, sought to be placed in possession of all redeemed properties, including the parcel now held by Tingin. The Court of First Instance initially ordered the sheriff to restore possession to Caliñgad’s estate but later reversed itself after Tingin presented evidence of his Torrens title and filed a separate action to protect his possession. Sunga then filed this petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to enforce the redemption and oust Tingin.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, as administratrix of Caliñgad’s estate, is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to restore possession of the disputed parcel, which was mistakenly levied upon as Caliñgad’s property but actually belonged to the judgment creditors (and now to Tingin), based on Caliñgad’s redemption of the properties sold at the execution sale.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus.

The Court held that the execution sale could only convey whatever interest Caliñgad had in the levied properties. Since the disputed parcel was at all times owned by the judgment creditors (Manalansan et al.) under a Torrens title, Caliñgad had no interest in it, and the sheriff’s sale conveyed nothing that could be redeemed. The doctrine of estoppel in *Jalbuena v. Lizarraga* (33 Phil. 77)where an owner who knowingly allows his property to be sold as belonging to the judgment debtor is estopped from later asserting titledoes not apply here because the judgment creditors themselves were the purchasers at the sale, and estoppel cannot be invoked both against and in favor of the same person. Moreover, Caliñgad, as judgment debtor, was not a party to such estoppel and could not acquire by redemption a title he never had.

The prior adjudication confirming Caliñgad’s right to redeem only determined the timeliness and validity of the redemption; it did not adjudicate title to the disputed parcel or expand Caliñgad’s interest beyond what was legally taken from him. The trial court acted within its discretion in reconsidering its initial order after Tingin presented new evidence of his Torrens title. Mandamus is inappropriate to control judicial discretion or to enforce a right that does not exist. The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.