G.R. No. 26757, October 11, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CIRILO SANDAL, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed an information charging Cirilo Sandal with violating Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States (Act of Congress of March 4, 1909). The information alleged that on or about July 26, 1925, in Camp Stotsenburg, Pampanga, the accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally entered and penetrated the military reserve without permission and despite an express prohibition from the camp authorities. The accused filed a general demurrer. The Court of First Instance sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case, ruling that Section 45 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code was not in force in the Philippine Islands. The Government, through the Attorney-General, appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether Section 45 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code (Act of March 4, 1909) is applicable and in force in the Philippine Islands.
2. Whether the information filed against the accused sufficiently charges an offense under the said law.

RULING

1. On the Applicability of the Law: YES. The Supreme Court held that Section 45 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code is in force in the Philippines. While the general territorial extension statute (Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878) does not apply to the Philippines, this does not preclude the enforcement of Congressional laws that are inherently of general application to specific subjects and are incidents of national sovereignty. Following the doctrine in *Tan Te vs. Bell* (27 Phil. 354), the Court ruled that laws enacted for the protection and governance of the U.S. Army, as an agency of national sovereignty, have inherent force and effect wherever the Army is lawfully established, including the Philippines. Section 45, which confers police power to authorities in charge of military reservations, is such a law and applies to Camp Stotsenburg.

2. On the Sufficiency of the Information: NO. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the dismissal but on a different ground. The Court examined the information in relation to the statute. Section 45 penalizes two acts: (a) going upon a military reservation for a purpose prohibited by law or regulation, or (b) reentering or being found within such reservation after having been removed or ordered not to reenter. The information merely alleged that the accused “entered and penetrated” the reservation without permission and despite a prohibition. It did not allege that his entry was for a prohibited purpose, nor did it use the crucial statutory language that he “reenter[ed] or [was] found within” after having been ordered not to reenter. The information therefore failed to charge facts constituting either of the offenses defined by the law. The defect was amendable, and the trial court should have ordered the filing of a new information under Section 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The appealed order was AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. It was affirmed insofar as it declared the information insufficient, but reversed insofar as it ordered the dismissal of the case and cancellation of the bond. The case was REMANDED to the trial court with instructions for the fiscal to file a new information conforming to the statute, and for the accused to be held for trial thereon.