G.R. No. 29562 , July 30, 1928
BEHN, MEYER & CO., H. MIJ., plaintiff, vs. CARL ANTHOLTZ, defendant.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Behn, Meyer & Co., filed an ordinary civil action against the defendant, Carl Antholtz, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff on December 31, 1927. The defendant received notice of this judgment on the same day. On January 26, 1928, the defendant filed an exception to the judgment and a motion for a new trial. The court denied the motion for a new trial on February 14, 1928, and notice of this order was received by the defendant’s attorneys on that date. The defendant filed his bill of exceptions on February 23, 1928. A dispute arose as to whether the defendant’s exception and notice of appeal were filed on February 20 or February 23, 1928. The trial judge, after investigation, found the correct date to be February 23, 1928. Consequently, the trial judge refused to sign and certify the bill of exceptions, prompting the defendant to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to do so.

ISSUE

Whether the defendant’s filing of a bill of exceptions within ten (10) days from notice of the order denying his motion for a new trial, but without having filed a separate notice of intention to appeal within the five (5)-day period prescribed in *Layda v. Legazpi*, constitutes a sufficient compliance with procedural requirements to perfect an appeal.

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, directing the trial judge to sign and certify the bill of exceptions.

The Court clarified the rules established in *Layda v. Legazpi*. While *Layda* set forth the procedure that an aggrieved party must (1) file a motion for new trial within 30 days, (2) after notice of its denial, file a notice of intention to present a bill of exceptions within 5 days, and (3) present the bill of exceptions itself within 10 days, the Court held that these rules should not be applied with excessive technicality.

The Court reconciled *Layda* with prior and subsequent jurisprudence. It cited *Luengo & Martinez v. Herrero*, which held that “the presentation of a bill of exceptions for approval, in due time, is equivalent to or involves an announcement of an intention to appeal.” It also cited *Pampolina and Vistal v. Suiza and Osuna*, which stated that if a bill of exceptions is presented within ten days from notice of the order denying a motion for new trial, the Supreme Court would take jurisdiction, albeit without reviewing the evidence if no exception to the denial was made.

In this case, the defendant presented his bill of exceptions nine (9) days after receiving notice of the denial of his motion for new trial. Although he did not file a separate notice of intention to appeal within the 5-day period, his act of filing the bill of exceptions within the 10-day period substantially complied with the law. The purpose of the time limits is to facilitate, not hinder, appeals. Since the defendant acted more swiftly (in 9 days) than the maximum period allowed for the two steps (15 days total), he aided the speedy administration of justice.

Furthermore, regarding the defendant’s exception to the order denying the new trial (filed along with the bill of exceptions on the 9th day), the Court held it was made within a “reasonable time” as required by the Code of Civil Procedure. The term “forthwith” is elastic and depends on circumstances. Under a liberal construction, a delay of nine days was not unreasonable.

Thus, the presentation of the bill of exceptions within ten days from notice of the denial of the motion for new trial is tantamount to an announcement of the intention to appeal and satisfies the substantive requirements for perfecting an appeal. The trial judge had a ministerial duty to approve and certify the bill of exceptions.