G.R. No. 34136, October 2, 1930
POTENCIANO MONTALBO, petitioner, vs. F. SANTAMARIA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Potenciano Montalbo was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila. He filed a motion for bail pursuant to Section 63 of General Orders No. 58 (the Code of Criminal Procedure), which allows bail before conviction except for capital offenses where the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. The respondent judge denied the motion, ruling that Section 3 of the Jones Law, which states that “all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences,” had repealed or abrogated the discretionary power of courts to grant bail in capital offenses under General Orders No. 58. The judge concluded he had no discretion to conduct a hearing to determine the strength of the evidence for purposes of bail. Montalbo then filed this petition for mandamus to compel the judge to perform his alleged ministerial duty to conduct such a hearing.

ISSUE

Whether Section 3 of the Jones Law repealed Section 63 of General Orders No. 58, thereby depriving courts of discretion to admit to bail a person accused of a capital offense regardless of the strength of the evidence of guilt.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, directing the respondent judge to conduct a hearing to determine whether the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong, as required under Section 63 of General Orders No. 58, before ruling on the application for bail.

The Court held that the Jones Law did not repeal Section 63 of General Orders No. 58. Section 26 of the Jones Law provides that the courts “shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided,” which includes the jurisdiction and procedure established by prior laws like General Orders No. 58. The power of courts to grant bail in capital offenses, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, was a jurisdiction conferred by General Orders No. 58 and was expressly preserved by the Jones Law. The Court cited its earlier decision in United States v. Babasa, which upheld the authority of Courts of First Instance to grant bail in capital cases under the same legal framework. Therefore, the respondent judge has a ministerial duty to conduct the necessary hearing to determine the entitlement to bail. The separate opinion of Justice Malcolm, arguing that the specific provision of the Jones Law prohibiting bail for capital offenses should control, was not adopted by the majority.