G.R. No. L-9044; November 3, 1913
SEVERINA FALCON and ROSARIO FALCON, plaintiffs, vs. ALBERTO BARRETTO, Judge of First Instance of Rizal, ET AL., defendants.

FACTS:
Mariano Santero, Valentin Toledo, and Mercedes Tibayan (predecessors-in-interest of the defendants) filed an action for unlawful detainer before the Justice of the Peace of Pasay against Severina Falcon (and her deceased husband). The complaint was based on a notarized instrument, executed by Falcon and her husband, which was denominated as a sale with pacto de retro (right to repurchase) to secure a debt of P927.36. The instrument stipulated that if the debt was not paid by December 31, 1912, the vendors would become the absolute owners of the property. The debt was not paid. The plaintiffs in the detainer case claimed that by operation of the contract, they became the absolute owners and were thus entitled to possession under the forcible entry and detainer statute. The Justice of the Peace ruled in their favor. Falcon appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Alberto Barretto, arguing that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction because the action necessarily involved a question of title to the property, not merely possession. The Court of First Instance affirmed the judgment. Falcon then filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking to annul the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether a Justice of the Peace (now Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court) has jurisdiction over an action for unlawful detainer where the right to possession is based on a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant-vendor contests the nature of the contract (claiming it is a mortgage) and, consequently, the plaintiff’s title.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and annulled the proceedings.
The Court held that the action was not a proper case for unlawful detainer under the forcible entry and detainer statute (Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure). The plaintiffs’ right to possession was derived solely from their claim of absolute ownership, which allegedly vested upon the failure to repurchase. This claim of ownership was directly and substantively contested by the defendant, who alleged the instrument was a mortgage, not a true pacto de retro sale. The resolution of this dispute required an adjudication on the true nature of the contract and the question of who had title to the property. Such a determination of title is beyond the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court, whose jurisdiction in detainer cases is limited to questions of possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership. Since the action necessarily involved a question of title, the Justice of the Peace acted without jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court of First Instance, on appeal, likewise had no jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the case for lack of original jurisdiction. The proceedings were therefore null and void.