G.R. No. L-8314; March 25, 1914
M. A. CLARKE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA CANDY COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The trial in the Court of First Instance was presided over by Frank B. Ingersoll, who was selected by counsel to act as a special judge. The authority for such selection is governed by Section 378 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits the parties to select a special judge in writing only if the regular judge is disqualified “as in this Code provided.” The record initially lacked the required order directing the entry of substitution of the special judge. To cure this defect, a nunc pro tunc order dated December 4, 1913 (made effective as of August 1, 1912) was subsequently filed. This order cited two grounds for the regular judges’ disqualification: (1) one judge had previously presided over a related criminal case involving the same subject matter, and (2) the counsel for the plaintiff was persona non grata in the remaining civil branch of the court. The parties had stipulated to these disqualifications and selected Ingersoll as special judge.

ISSUE:
Whether the selection of the special judge, Frank B. Ingersoll, was valid and conferred upon him jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Court held that the selection and substitution of a special judge were without legal authority and therefore void. Section 378 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the selection of a special judge only when the regular judge is disqualified under the specific grounds enumerated in the Code itself, particularly those listed in Section 8. The alleged disqualifications cited in the nunc pro tunc orderprior involvement in a related case and counsel being persona non grataare not among the statutory grounds for disqualification provided in the Code. Consequently, the parties’ agreement and the subsequent order did not comply with the law. Since the special judge lacked jurisdiction, all proceedings before him, including the judgment rendered, were invalid. The Court did not rule on the propriety of curing the defect via a nunc pro tunc order, as the foundational disqualifications were legally insufficient. No costs were awarded.