G.R. No. L-9786; March 31, 1915
ARSENIA CHAVES and SIMEON GARCIA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On June 17, 1912, a streetcar owned and operated by The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company (defendant), driven by its employee Enrique Clemente, struck and killed three-year-old Juan Garcia on Calle Dakota, Manila. The motorman, Enrique Clemente, was criminally prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence. He was initially convicted of simple negligence but, on appeal to the Supreme Court, his conviction was modified to one for reckless negligence.

The deceased child’s mother, Arsenia Chaves (joined later by her husband Simeon Garcia), filed a civil action for damages against the defendant company, alleging that Clemente’s negligence was imputable to his employer. The plaintiffs sought ₱15,000 in damages. The defendant demurred, arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the criminal prosecution of Clemente had reached final judgment without any reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. The trial court overruled the demurrer. After trial, the court found the defendant liable and awarded ₱1,000 in damages. Both parties appealed: the plaintiffs contended the award was insufficient, while the defendant argued it should not be liable at all.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the failure to expressly reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case against the employee bars a subsequent civil action for damages against the employer.
2. Whether, under the facts, the defendant company is civilly liable for damages arising from the death of the child.

RULING:
1. On the necessity of reserving the right to file a separate civil action:
The Supreme Court held that no such reservation was necessary. The civil action was against the employer, not the employee who was criminally convicted. The employer and employee are distinct parties, and their liabilities are separate under the law. The criminal conviction of the employee does not automatically determine the civil liability of the employer. Therefore, the civil action against the company was not barred by the prior criminal judgment.

2. On the civil liability of the defendant company:
The Supreme Court, examining the evidence, found that the defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family (diligentissimi patrisfamilias) in the selection and supervision of its employees. The negligence was solely attributable to the employee, Enrique Clemente. Under the principles of quasi-delict (Article 1903 of the Civil Code, as then in force), an employer who proves such diligence is not liable for the negligent acts of its employee. Consequently, the defendant company was not civilly liable.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The judgment of the trial court was reversed. The defendant company was relieved of all liability under the complaint. No costs were awarded.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
– Justice Moreland concurred, agreeing that the defendant was free from negligence.
– Justice Torres dissented.