G.R. No. L-8975; July 23, 1915
ZACARIAS CONSPECTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO FRUTO, et al., defendants; SILVESTRE FURING, et al., appellants.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Zacarias Conspecto filed an action on March 9, 1912, to recover possession of a 59-hectare parcel of land. He derived his title from a series of transactions: the land was originally purchased from the government by Jose Ramos Goy Sengco in 1893 (title registered in 1897), sold to Venancio Liquigan in 1897 (title registered in 1912), and then sold to Conspecto by Liquigan’s heirs in 1911 (title registered in 1912). Neither Conspecto nor his predecessors-in-interest had ever been in actual possession of the land.

The defendants, including appellants Silvestre Furing, Marcelo Banastao, Leon Fruto, Micael Barrameda, Eutiquio Bigata, Francisco Estopare, Alfonso Boncan, and Florentino Hitosis, were in open, adverse, and continuous possession of various portions of the land for periods ranging from twenty to thirty years prior to 1912. Some defendants held documents of possession dating back to 18901894, though unregistered. In 1907, Venancio Liquigan had filed a similar action against the defendants, but it was dismissed and not recommenced. The trial court awarded possession to Conspecto, except as to two defendants not parties to this appeal. The appellants contended that Conspecto’s action had prescribed and that they had acquired ownership by prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff’s action to recover possession of the land is barred by the statute of limitations (prescription of action).

RULING:
Yes, the action is barred by prescription. The Supreme Court held that Section 40 of Act No. 190 (Code of Procedure in Civil Actions), which provides a ten-year prescriptive period for actions to recover title to or possession of real property, applies to the case. Since the action was filed on March 9, 1912, and Act No. 190 took effect on October 1, 1901, more than ten years had elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action. The defendants’ open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession for over ten years prior to the suit extinguished the plaintiff’s right to recover.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Article 1963 of the Civil Code (thirty-year prescription) should apply, noting that where the entire ten-year period under Act No. 190 had expired before the action was filed, the latter governs. The Court also ruled that the earlier action filed by Liquigan in 1907 did not interrupt the prescriptive period because it was dismissed and abandoned, leaving the parties as if no action had been filed.

Since the action was barred by prescription, the Court did not address the other assignments of error. The judgment of the lower court against the appellants was reversed, and they were relieved from liability. No costs were awarded.