G.R. No. L-10379; August 5, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS JAVIER and MARIANO CAGUICLA, defendants. MARIANO CAGUICLA, appellant.

FACTS:
On the morning of July 10, 1914, Barbara Saliva, a 12-year-old girl, went to the house of Mariano Caguicla. As she was leaving, Caguicla, who was underneath the house, called her. When she approached, he invited her toward some trees behind the house. Upon her refusal, Caguicla seized her hands, covered her mouth to prevent her from crying out, and dragged her toward the trees. He then shouted to his neighbor, Nicolas Javier, “Nicolas, here she is!” Javier appeared, seized the girl, and forcibly took her further into the woods. Despite her opposition, resistance, and cries, Javier, by threatening her with a pocketknife and twisting her hair, succeeded in raping her. The crime was witnessed in part by two young girls. After the rape, Barbara Saliva immediately reported the crime to the barrio lieutenant. A subsequent medical examination confirmed that she had been raped while still a virgin. Both Javier and Caguicla were arrested. The trial court convicted both. Nicolas Javier was sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, and Mariano Caguicla to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional. Only Caguicla appealed the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant Mariano Caguicla is liable as a principal, and not merely as an accessory, in the crime of rape committed by Nicolas Javier.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that Mariano Caguicla cooperated in the perpetration of the crime by acts without which it could not have been consummated. His actscatching and holding the victim, forcibly conducting her to an isolated spot, calling his confederate Javier, and delivering the victim to himdirectly facilitated the commission of the rape. These acts fall under paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Penal Code, which defines a principal as one who cooperates in the execution of the offense by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. Therefore, Caguicla is a principal by direct participation, not a mere accessory.

The Court rejected Caguicla’s denial and found the testimony of the victim, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, to be conclusive proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended his participation. Accordingly, the penalty must be imposed in its medium degree.

The judgment of the trial court was modified. The Supreme Court set aside Caguicla’s original sentence and instead sentenced him, as a principal, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessories, joint and several indemnity to the victim, and payment of costs.